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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2020, a large population of Americans believed that a mask
mandate during a global pandemic violated their Constitutional
rights.1 Conversely, a large sect of the American population also
believed that the government limiting a woman’s bodily autonomy
is not a violation of Constitutional rights.2 In 2016, Donald Trump
vowed to only appoint “pro-life” Supreme Court justices if he were
elected President.3 And with the passing of the notorious Justice
* Colleen Reider, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022, UIC School of Law. I would
like to thank everyone and anyone who helped me write this paper. I could not
have done this without the encouragement and reinforcement from my family,
friends, and professors. I would also like to thank the endless line of strong and
independent women who have steered me on the path of fighting for the
protection of women’s rights, including the right to choose.
1. See John E. Finn, The Constitution doesn’t have a problem with mask
mandates, CONVERSATION (July 22, 2020), www.theconversation.com/theconstitution-doesnt-have-a-problem-with-mask-mandates-142335
[perma.cc/7AW7-FZ6A] (explaining that some Americans believe the Public
Health Mandate requiring all Americans to wear a mask for public health
purposes is a violation of their constitutional rights).
2. See Domenico Montanaro, Poll: Majority Want to Keep Abortion Legal, but
They
Also
Want
Restrictions,
NPR
(June
7,
2019),
www.npr.org/2019/06/07/730183531/poll-majority-want-to-keep-abortion-legalbut-they-also-want-restrictions [perma.cc/WN24-LMF7] (analyzing how many
Americans believe abortion needs to be restricted and limited by allowing the
government to govern the issue).
3. Dan Mangan, Trump: I’ll appoint Supreme Court justices to overturn Roe
v. Wade abortion case, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2016), www.cnbc.com/2016/10/19/trumpill-appoint-supreme-court-justices-to-overturn-roe-v-wade-abortion-case.html
[perma.cc/E7Q3-MJ7R]. On the possibility of overturning Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1972), President Trump said during his third televised debate with
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, “[t]hat will happen automatically in my
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Trump fulfilled this promise.4
On October 26, 2020, the Senate confirmed President Trump’s
nominee, Amy Coney Barrett, to the United States Supreme Court
by a vote of 52-48.5 Judge Barrett served on the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals for three years, where she ruled in favor of
restricting access to abortion6 while also referring to abortion as
being “always immoral.”7 Further, she shared that she does not
agree with a strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis because
it “is not a hard-and-fast rule in the Court’s constitutional cases,”
and it would be better to enforce her “understanding of the
Constitution rather than a precedent she thinks clearly in conflict
with it.”8 With the addition of Judge Barrett, there is now a six-tothree conservative-to-liberal majority on the Court.9 Most of the
opinion[] because I am putting pro-life justices on the court.” Ron Elving, Which
Trump Should Be Believed on Overturning Roe v. Wade, NPR (July 3, 2018),
www.npr.org/2018/07/03/625410441/which-trump-should-be-believed-onoverturning-roe-v-wade [perma.cc/LB4S-RTV6].
4. Dan Mangan, Trump says he will announce Supreme Court nomination
to replace Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Saturday, CNBC (Sept. 22, 2020),
www.cnbc.com/2020/09/22/trump-will-name-supreme-court-pick-to-replaceginsburg-on-saturday.html [perma.cc/RZW8-8H2X]. On September 18, 2020,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away at age 87 from complications of
pancreatic cancer. Nina Totenberg, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Champion of
Gender
Equality,
Dies
at
87,
NPR
(Sept.
18,
2020),
www.npr.org/2020/09/18/100306972/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-champion-ofgender-equality-dies-at-87 [perma.cc/MM8J-L2FB]. About six weeks later, the
Senate confirmed Justice Amy Coney Barrett to the Court. Seung Min Kim,
Senate Confirms Barrett to Supreme Court, Cementing its Conservative
Majority,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
16,
2020),
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/senate-court-barretttrump/2020/10/26/df76c07e-1789-11eb-befb-8864259bd2d8_story.html
[perma.cc/LG95-AEBK].
5. See Grace Segers, Amy Coney Barrett sworn in as newest Supreme Court
justice, CBS (Oct. 27, 2020), www.cbsnews.com/news/amy-coney-barrettsupreme-court-justice-sworn-in/ [perma.cc/5Q2P-KH2N] (stating that the
addition of Amy Coney Barrett to the Court is concerning Democrats over the
fate of Roe v. Wade and the right to abortion).
6. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r. of Ind. State Dep’t of
Health, 917 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Judge
Barrett joined the dissent arguing in support of an Indiana law requiring
physicians to inform the parents of a minor seeking an abortion. Id.
7. John H. Garvey & Amy C. Barrett, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81
MARQ. L. REV. 303, 316 (2005); Judicial and Justice Department Pending
Nominations, Senate Judiciary Comm. Confirmation Hearing, 115th Cong.
(2017) (statement of Amy Coney Barrett, Judicial Nominee, Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals) (demonstrating Judge Barrett’s past opinions and statements
about abortion always being immoral and her adherence to the teachings of the
Catholic religion on important legal matters).
8. See Amy C. Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 1711, 1726 (2012-13) (showing that Judge Barret is not likely to follow
the doctrine of stare decisis in upholding Roe due to her disagreement with the
Court’s adherence to the doctrine in general).
9. See Joan Biskupic, The Supreme Court hasn’t been this conservative since
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justices have shown their willingness to restrict access to the right
to an abortion in their previous opinions and holdings.10 This has
dire implications for women and their right to undergo an abortion,
as well as the landmark precedent set by Roe v. Wade.11 Judge
Barrett’s appointment to the Supreme Court is the anti-abortion
and conservative movement’s absolute dream come true.12
In June 2020, the Court struck down a Louisiana abortion
restriction that would have left Louisiana women with no abortion
providers in the whole state.13 Since this ruling, the Court, with the
addition of Judge Barret, has taken up one abortion case finding
against the abortion providers and patients,14 and have recently
taken up another on December 1, 2021.15 Three months prior, the
Court refused to grant a preliminary injunction blocking a Texas
abortion law that amounts to a ban on abortions beginning after a
woman reaches six weeks of pregnancy.16 The future of the
constitutional right for a woman to undergo an abortion is patently
the 1930s, CNN (Sep. 26, 2020), www.cnn.com/2020/09/26/politics/supremecourt-conservative/index.html [perma.cc/A9XB-FZTV] (demonstrating that the
Court would be incredibly conservative-leaning with the addition of Amy Coney
Barrett to the bench alongside Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Thomas, Kavanaugh,
and Chief Justice Roberts).
10. See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2330
(2016), as revised (June 27, 2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating his
disagreement with the holding of Roe); id. at 2330 (Chief Justice Roberts joining
in the dissenting opinion) (indicating the Chief Justice’s position that the
holding of Roe was incorrect); id. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing in
favor of a Texas abortion regulation that would severely burden a women’s
meaningful exercise of her right to undergo an abortion); June Med. Serv. L. L.
C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2171 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (finding that
abortion providers do not have standing to bring suit on behalf of their patients
and that the Louisiana law did not restrict access to abortion); id. at 2182
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of a Louisiana abortion regulation
that would have the effect of closing all abortion clinics in the state except for
one).
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12. See Nina Totenburg, Amy Coney Barrett: A Dream for the Right,
Nightmare
for
the
Left,
NPR
(Sept.
28,
2020),
www.npr.org/2020/09/28/917554001/amy-coney-barrett-a-dream-for-the-rightnightmare-for-the-left [perma.cc/4UB7-FTM8] (explaining that because of thenJudge Barrett’s religious and conservative beliefs and backgrounds, she is likely
to vote against the pro-choice movement and the central tenants of a woman’s
decisional privacy to choose whether or not to terminate her pregnancy in future
abortion cases if she is appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court).
13. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
14. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021).
15. Amy Howe, Roe v. Wade hangs in balance as reshaped court prepares to
hear biggest abortion case in decades, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 29, 2021),
www.scotusblog.com/2021/11/roe-v-wade-hangs-in-balance-as-reshaped-courtprepares-to-hear-biggest-abortion-case-in-decades/ [perma.cc/2ZKA-YA85].
16. See Jackson, 141 S. Ct. at 2495 (blocking the proposal for a preliminary
injunction to stop the abortion law from going into effect).
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unprotected in the context of today’s social and political climate.17
But a majority of the American people agree with the precedent set
by Roe and want it to remain.18
In order to fully comprehend the controversy behind the right
to abortion in the American judicial and legal systems, Part II of
this case note will discuss the relevant Supreme Court precedent
dealing with the controversial abortion right that led to the Court’s
decision in the June 2020 case of June Medical Services L.L.C. v.
Russo.19 Part III of this case note will analyze the Russo decision
where the Court struck down a state regulation finding that it
significantly burdened a woman’s right to choose whether or not to
undergo an abortion by balancing the benefits of the regulation
versus its burdens.20 Part IV will demonstrate how the Court’s
review of Russo has resulted in the weakening of the abortion right
and has opened it up to future legal uncertainty and criticism.
Finally, Part V of this case note will provide a personal analysis of
Russo. The issue surrounding the governmental regulation of the
abortion right is significant today because, as women’s rights
activist and attorney Harriet Pilpel admonished, abortion “is in fact
the most important single method of birth control in the world
today.”21

II. BACKGROUND
Abortion practices have been a part of women’s history long
before the controversial debate landed at the courthouse stairs.22
Abortion practices were once unregulated and accessible to
American women of all different backgrounds until the practice

17. See Nora Ellman, State Actions Undermining Abortion Rights in 2020,
CTR.
FOR
A M.
PROGRESS
(Aug.
27,
2020),
www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2020/08/27/489786/stateactions-undermining-abortion-rights-2020/ [perma.cc/5QAK-5GTZ] (portraying
the uncertain future of the abortion right due to the amount of abortion
challenges and regulations being put into legislation during recent times).
18. Melissa Holzberg & Ben Kamisar, Poll: Majority of adults don’t support
overturning
Roe
v.
Wade,
NBC
NEWS
(Sept.
29,
2020),
www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/poll-majority-adults-don-t-supportoverturning-roe-v-wade-n1241269 [perma.cc/W5UR-8BYF]. Sixty-six percent of
adult Americans say they don’t think the Supreme Court should overturn Roe.
Id.
19. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
20. Id. at 2132.
21. Harriet Pilpel, The Right of Abortion, ATLANTIC (June 1969),
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1969/06/the-right-of-abortion/303366/
[perma.cc/2DK5-M63J].
22. Treva B. Lindsey, A concise history of the US abortion debate,
CONVERSATION (June 10, 2019), www.theconversation.com/a-concise-historyof-the-us-abortion-debate-118157 [perma.cc/EZ29-RXMU].
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started to become criminalized.23 By the twentieth century, every
state had characterized abortion as a felony, but abortion services
were still common and sought after by American women.24 During
the 1960s and 1970s, there was tremendous growth in anti- and proabortion organizations bringing the hotly contested issue of
abortion back into the spotlight and into the courthouse.25 This long
history led to the Supreme Court’s most important ruling for
abortion services in U.S. history, Roe v. Wade.26
First, this section will examine the landmark precedent set by
Roe, along with the holding’s effects on abortion regulations during
the years after it was set. Second, it will touch on how the Supreme
Court decided to limit the scope of Roe in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey by changing the standard for how cases dealing with the
abortion issue were to be analyzed. Then, this section will explain
this Court’s established precedent in Whole Women’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, where the Court struck down restrictions placed on
abortion providers for creating an undue burden on Texas Women’s
right to choose to undergo an abortion just three years earlier by
the Court. Further, it will examine the admitting privileges
requirement and “Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers”
(“TRAP”) laws that have a negative effect on the preservation and
security of the abortion right, including its future. Finally, this
section will provide a brief factual and procedural background of the
topic of this case note: June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo.

A. The Implied Fundamental Right to an Abortion: Roe
v. Wade
Fundamental rights are those which are expressly enumerated
in the Constitution27 and have been recognized by the Supreme
Court as being owed a “high degree of protection from government
encroachment.”28 There are also rights deemed so fundamental
that, although not enumerated in the Constitution, they are given
a high degree of protection from government regulation and control,
implied fundamental rights.29 One of the earliest implied
fundamental rights was the right to privacy, which was developed
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Lindsey, supra note 22 (detailing the long
history surrounding societal and governmental attitudes relating to abortion).
27.
Fundamental
right,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
www.merriamwebster.com/legal/fundamental%20right [perma.cc/ZE37-FZET] (last visited
Feb. 26, 2021).
28. Fundamental Right, CORNELL LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fundamental_right [perma.cc/GA26-BM89] (last
visited Feb. 26, 2021).
29. Id.
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from the realization that intangible things, such as thoughts,
sensations, and emotions, were in need of being recognized.30
Eventually, in 1965, the Supreme Court recognized that citizens of
the United States had an implied fundamental right of privacy
which broadly encompassed different interests of individuals.31 In
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court reasoned that the Ninth
Amendment in conjunction with several constitutional guarantees
emanating from the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments,
allowed for the implied fundamental right of privacy even though
it’s not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.32 Justice
Douglas ruled that within the several constitutional guarantees of
the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments are various “zones
of privacy” on which the government should not be able to encroach
upon.33
In Roe, Justice Blackmun ruled that a woman’s decision to
undergo an abortion is within the zones of privacy advanced in
Griswold.34 Therefore, that decision is encompassed within the
implied fundamental right of privacy and is owed strong protection
against governmental and state intrusion.35 This was the first time
the Supreme Court recognized a woman’s implied fundamental
right to choose to undergo an abortion.36 The Court struck down
burdensome abortion regulations using a strict scrutiny standard
and rigid trimester framework that would continue to be the
standard of review for abortion regulations for years to come.37 To
satisfy strict scrutiny, state governments must prove they had a
compelling state interest in regulating abortions and that the
legislative means in doing so were the least restrictive means
available.38
Roe invalidated a Texas law that prohibited women from
seeking a first trimester abortion for any reason except when it
would save their life.39 The State of Texas argued that it had an
30. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890).
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. Id. at 484-85.
33. Id.
34. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
35. See Roe, 410 U.S at 153-54 (rationalizing the implied fundamental right
of privacy is “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy”).
36. Id. (“We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be
considered against important state interests in regulation.”).
37. Id. at 162-63.
38. See United States. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938)
(establishing that when the government is attempting to regulate the
fundamental rights of an individual, there needs to be a higher standard of
review in place, such as strict scrutiny).
39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-66.
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important interest in protecting the potential life of a fetus because
“life begins at conception.”40 The state also argued that the law
protected the health of the mother from risks emanating from the
abortion procedure.41 The Roe court recognized that a woman’s right
to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy was an interest
encompassed within this implied fundamental right of privacy.42
But even though the Court recognized a woman’s right to choose, it
is not absolute and states still have the discretion to regulate
abortion in order to safeguard compelling interests of maternal
health, medical standards, and the protection of potential life.43
Justice Blackmun relied on evidence to show that abortion is
relatively safe if performed early in a pregnancy and mortality rates
are lower in abortion than they are in normal childbirth.44 Based on
this evidence, the Court held that a state’s regulation prohibiting a
first trimester abortion does not reasonably relate to the state’s
interest in preserving maternal health because these risks do not
become compelling interests until the end of the first trimester.45
Additionally, the Court found no evidence that life begins at
conception and recognized that a state only has a compelling
interest in preserving potential life when there is a viable fetus
involved, which can be found only after the first trimester.46 The
Court rejected the states’ interests because they did not outweigh a
woman’s privacy interest in deciding to undergo an abortion.47 The
Court expressly recognized that a woman’s right to choose during
the first trimester falls within the purview of the implied
fundamental right of privacy.48 The Court also divided pregnancy
into three equal trimesters, giving the greatest strength to a
woman’s implied fundamental right to choose within the first
trimester of pregnancy.49 Because a woman’s right to choose was
deemed an implied fundamental right of privacy, strict scrutiny was

40. Id. at 159.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 153; History.com Editors, Roe v. Wade, HISTORY (July 22, 2021),
www.history.com/topics/womens-rights/roe-v-wade [perma.cc/3Y4B-UMG7].
43. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149-52.
44. Id. at 149.
45. Id. at 162-63.
46. Id. at 163.
47. Id. at 162; see Reuters Staff, Explainer: Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade
decision hinged on women’s right to privacy, Reuters (Sept. 23, 2020),
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-abortion-roevwade-explainer/explainersupreme-courts-roe-v-wade-decision-hinged-on-womens-right-to-privacyidUSKCN26E1LU [perma.cc/5JG5-JVJF] (indicating that even though the
Court agreed that Texas had a legitimate interest in protecting the health of
the pregnant woman, there would be a more significant detriment in denying a
woman’s choice and right to choose due to the acceptance of this state interest).
48. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
49. Id. at 163.
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used.50
Roe is a landmark case that established the precedent that
gives strength to women’s reproductive and civil rights, but it has
been unprotected and attacked since the day it was decided.51
During the years closely following the decision in Roe, legal abortion
services skyrocketed throughout the United States and mortality
rates of pregnant women decreased.52 But it also came with an
increase in state level regulations attempting to create exceptions
to Roe and involve areas of law that the precedent did not address.53
Instead of Roe serving as an established precedent for women’s
right to choose, it was attacked and contested by many individuals
which eventually led to its modification.54

B. Narrowing the Scope of Roe: The Emergence of the
Undue Burden Standard
Roe established that strict scrutiny would be used when
analyzing governmental and state regulations that restrict a
woman’s access to an abortion.55 Due to the controversy caused by
its holding, the Court narrowed Roe’s scope in Planned Parenthood
of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey by lowering the standard of review
from strict scrutiny to the undue burden standard.56 Under this new
standard, the government has the burden of demonstrating that the
regulation does not have “the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of

50. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152, n. 4.
51. Roe v. Wade: The Constitutional Right to Access Safe, Legal Abortion,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD,
www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/issues/abortion/roe-v-wade
[perma.cc/JDK9-2RS4] (last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
52. See Willard Cates, Jr., David A. Grimes & Kenneth F. Schulz, The Public
Health Impact of Legal Abortion: 30 Years Later, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL &
REPROD. HEALTH 25 (2003) (indicating that after the legalization of abortion by
Roe, abortions increased to 1.6 million in 1980 and continued at the rate
through the 1990s).
53. Roe v. Wade - Then and Now, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS (July 7, 2007),
www.reproductiverights.org/document/roe-v-wade-then-and-now
[perma.cc/3VPG-KZ4P] (attesting that the decisional privacy of women to
choose to undergo an abortion was under attack like no other right had been
before it by the state legislatures).
54. See id. (reviewing the countless attacks on and the undermining of the
holding of Roe by state legislatures leading to its narrowing of scope and
medication in Casey).
55. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63.
56. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992)
(establishing the undue burden standard as the appropriate standard of review
for state abortion regulations recognizing that abortions don’t only affect the
pregnant women, but also other individuals and the state interests of protecting
and preserving potentiality of life and maternal health).
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a non-viable fetus.”57 In Casey, the Court did not throw out the
central holding of Roe but modified it to balance the compelling
state interests of protecting the potentiality of life and maternal
health against the privacy right of the pregnant woman.58
1. Factual Findings Differing from Roe
In Casey, the Court decided that the rigid trimester framework
and strict scrutiny standard applied in Roe undermined the
important state interests of protecting the potentiality of life.59
Roe’s rigid trimester framework was thrown out, but the Court
noted that a state could legally still regulate abortion after a
woman’s pregnancy reached the crucial point of “fetal viability.”60
According to Casey, the recent advances in neonatal care had
“advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier” than what was
decided in Roe.61 Because of this new found crucial point of viability,
some state abortion regulations during the first trimester could now
be found constitutional.62 This included regulations that involved
the state taking steps before viability to ensure that the choice to
undergo an abortion was “thoughtful and informed.”63 The Court
even went so far as to recognize that regulations that have the effect
of persuading pregnant women to choose childbirth over abortion
are constitutional, while regulations that coerce this decision are
not.64 Additionally, the Court decided that because all medical
procedures can be regulated by the states to further its health and
safety interests, the same premise should be afforded to abortion.65
But “unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect
of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
abortion” cannot be upheld under the undue burden standard.66
Therefore, unlike Roe, the undue burden standard was deemed the
57. Id. at 877.
58. Id. at 878.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 872; see Adam Liptak, Fetal Viability, Long an Abortion Dividing
Line, Faces a Supreme Court Test, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2021),
www.nytimes.com/2021/11/28/us/politics/supreme-court-mississippi-abortionlaw.html (exampling that the Casey Court found the viability line workable and
open to regulation).
61. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860 (arguing that due to the advancements in
neonatal care, viability can be found during the first trimester, meaning that
state abortion regulations can be considered constitutional during the first
trimester of a women’s pregnancy).
62. Id. at 872.
63. Id.
64. See Id. at 872-73, 878 (illustrating the modification made by the Court’s
decision to allow regulations and the government to persuade women to undergo
childbirth as opposed to abortion, which was forbidden under the Roe decision).
65. Id. at 874.
66. Id. at 878.
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appropriate standard of review for state abortion regulations
because the right to choose is not absolute, and not all governmental
regulations of abortion can be considered undue.67
2. Saying Goodbye to Strict Scrutiny in the Abortion
Context
The narrowing of the scope of review by the Court in Casey
preserved the central tenants of Roe but also opened the door to
heavy state regulation designed to “persuade” women to choose
childbirth instead of an abortion.68 The Court’s decision was clear
that, if a governmental regulation imposed an undue burden on a
woman’s meaningful exercise of her implied fundamental right to
choose, it would be considered unconstitutional, no matter how
compelling the state’s interests in protecting the potentiality of life
and maternal health might be.69 But if the regulation merely makes
it more difficult for a pregnant woman to exercise her decisional
privacy, then the regulation will be upheld.70 The last important
modification that the Casey Court made was that states could now
regulate in a way that completely prohibited abortion of viable
fetuses.71
Casey may not be as well-known as Roe, but it is important
because it changed the way courts were to review abortion
regulations in the future.72 The modifications made in Casey left
unanswered important questions.73 The Court never defined what
67. Id. at 876.
68. Id. at 872-73, 878; see Emily Crockett, How the Supreme Court weakened
Roe v. Wade and set the stage for a new abortion case, VOX (Mar. 1, 2016),
www.vox.com/2016/1/22/10815708/roe-v-wade-supreme-court-weakenedabortion [perma.cc/Z69X-TUX9] (emphasizing that the Casey holding opened
the doors to a host of new restrictions that would likely have been held as
unconstitutional under a Roe analysis).
69. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
70. Id. at 873-74.
71. Id. at 879; Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (defining fetal viability at “about seven
months (twenty-eight weeks) but may occur earlier, even at twenty-four
weeks”).
72. Nina Martin, The Most Important Abortion Case You Never Heard About,
PROPUBLICA (Feb. 29, 2016), www.propublica.org/article/the-most-importantabortion-case-you-never-heard-about [perma.cc/HXS3-FBWZ] (explaining how
Casey developed a new abortion legal standard that gave greater latitude to
regulate abortion and led to conservative legislatures taking advantage and
enacting abortion regulations that made it more difficult for women to obtain
access to abortion services).
73. See generally Margaret Talbot, The Supreme Court’s Just Application Of
The Undue-Burden Standard For Abortion, NEW YORKER (June 27, 2016),
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-supreme-courts-just-application-ofthe-undue-burden-standard-for-abortion [perma.cc/7VBT-6FZU] (indicating
that the Casey court never clearly defined what an undue burden was, or how
to specifically apply the standard); see Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the
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substantial obstacles would be considered an undue burden.74 Casey
only created a subjective test in which the individual judges have to
decide for themselves what constitutes an undue burden.75
Therefore, the Casey decision provided little guidance on how the
undue burden standard was to be applied.76

C. Supplying Guidance: Asserting the Benefits vs. the
Burdens
Twenty-four years after the Court’s decision in Casey, Whole
Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt supplied guidance on how the undue
burden standard was to be applied.77 In Hellerstedt, the Court
struck down two Texas abortion regulations that conveyed
insufficient medical benefits to justify the burdens they placed on a
Texas woman meaningfully exercising her right to choose.78 Justice
Breyer decided that the appropriate application of the undue
burden standard was to balance the real-world benefits versus the
burdens that state abortion regulations have on a woman’s right to
choose.79 Justice Breyer struck down the physician’s admitting
privileges and surgical center requirements because the burdens
they imposed heavily outweighed the benefits of the regulation.80
1. Admitting Privileges Requirement
The admitting privileges requirement imposed by Texas’s
House Bill 2 regulation required physicians who performed
abortions to have their own individual hospital admitting privileges
within thirty miles of the clinic where the abortion was to be
performed.81 Before this change in law, abortion providers were
required “to have admitting privileges or have a working
Undue Burden Standard: Orienting “Casey” in Constitutional Jurisprudence,
94 COL. L. REV. 2025, 2031 (Oct. 1994) (detailing that judges have to apply their
own subjective approach and analysis of facts when deciding if they satisfy the
undue burden standard because there was no clearly defined analysis or rule
developed in Casey).
74. See Margaret Talbot, supra note 73 (explaining that judge’s had no clear
rule or standard to follow in determining what could be considered an undue
burden); Metzger, supra note 73 at 2031 (arguing that the Casey Court never
provided a clear definition or test for judges to consider in cases dealing with
the undue burden standard and abortion).
75. Metzger, supra note 73 at 2031.
76. Id. at 2035 (stating that “the opinion failed to explain how the effects of
regulations should be calculated, how much of an effect is necessary for a
finding of undue burden, or what types of effects are relevant.”).
77. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292.
78. Id. at 2299.
79. Id. at 2309.
80. Id. at 2299.
81. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West 2020).
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arrangement with a physician(s) who ha[d] admitting privileges at
a local hospital in order to ensure the necessary back up for medical
complications.”82 The previous law supplied abortion providers with
more options to legally perform abortion services. The state argued
that the purpose of this requirement was “to help ensure that
women have easy access to a hospital should complications arise.”83
But based on the evidence presented before the Court, abortion in
Texas was extremely safe with low rates of complications and
almost no deaths before the passage of this requirement.84 There
was no health related problem that the requirement aimed to cure.85
The district court found that the admitting privileges requirement
had the effect of decreasing the number of Texas abortion facilities
from forty to around twenty, creating an undue burden on a
woman’s right to choose.86 In effect, there would have been “fewer
doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding.”87 The Court
held that the admitting privileges requirement imposed too many
burdens on Texas women attempting to access abortion services,
and combined with the absence of significant health benefits, it
placed a substantial obstacle in the path of Texas women exercising
their right to choose.88 Consequently, the Court struck down the
admitting privileges requirement.89
2. Ambulatory Surgical Center Requirement
The second provision of Texas’s House Bill 2 was the
ambulatory-surgical center requirement.90 This law required
abortion facilities to meet numerous health and safety
requirements, including meeting the minimum standards for
ambulatory surgical centers.91 The district court was presented
with considerable evidence that the surgical center requirement did
not benefit patients and was not necessary.92 The district court
found that “women will not obtain better care or experience more
82. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.56 (2020).
83. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2311.
84. See id. (the evidence included a collection of five studies on abortion
complications during the first trimester showing that the highest rate of
complications was less than one percent, expert testimony stating that
complications are rare and rarely require transfer to a hospital, figures of three
studies on abortion complications during the second trimester that showed the
highest rate of these complications was less than one percent, etc.).
85. Id.
86. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681 (W.D. Tex.
2014).
87. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010 (West 2020).
91. Id.
92. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2315.
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frequent positive outcomes at an ambulatory surgical center as
compared to a previously licensed facility.”93 The surgical center
provision imposed a requirement that was not based on differences
between abortion and other procedures that were reasonably
related to preserving women’s health.94 Further, the
implementation of this requirement had the potential of further
decreasing the number of abortion clinics in Texas.95 The district
court indicated from this evidence that the few abortion providers
left would not be able to meet the demand for abortion services for
the entire State of Texas.96
The Court held that there was ample evidence to uphold the
district court’s finding that the surgical center requirement placed
a substantial obstacle in the way of a Texas woman seeking an
abortion.97 Much like the admitting privileges requirement, the
surgical center requirement provided little to no health benefits for
women, imposed a substantial obstacle, and constituted an undue
burden on a woman’s right to choose.98 Justice Breyer balanced the
benefits and the burdens created by the Texas regulation to decide
whether an undue burden was imposed on Texas women looking to
meaningfully exercise their right to undergo an abortion.99 Four
years after Breyer’s guidance on the standard in Hellerstedt, June
Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo was heard by the Court.100 But this
time the future of the abortion right would be left unprotected and
uncertain.

D. TRAP Laws and The Controversial Admitting
Privileges Requirement
In both the most recent Supreme Court cases examining the
abortion rights issue, Hellerstedt and Russo, state regulations
attempting to enforce an admitting privileges requirement on

93. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684.
94. Id.
95. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2316.
96. Lakey, 46 F. Supp 3d at 682.
97. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2316 (supporting the district court’s
conclusion that “many of the building standards mandated by the act and its
implementing rules have such a tangential relationship to patient safety in the
context of abortion as to be nearly arbitrary”).
98. Id. at 2318 (relying on the evidence presented to the district court that
indicated closures of almost half the forty abortion clinics in Texas, impossible
demands and standards abortion clinics would be required to meet, and the
irrelevant and little to no health benefits that the requirement imposes).
99. Id. at 2309.
100. See Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2112 (representing that Russo is a case with
almost identical facts to Hellerstedt that ended with the Court striking down an
admitting privileges requirement as unconstitutional).
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abortion providers were found unconstitutional.101 The admitting
privilege requirement is known as a form of TRAP law.102 These
laws target abortion providers for unnecessary medical and political
state regulations.103 TRAP laws are specifically made to weaken
access to the abortion right and attempt to end access to abortion
all together through the closure of abortion clinics.104 Admitting
privileges are difficult to obtain because they often require
providers to live within a certain distance from the hospital and for
them to admit a certain number of patients a year.105 In the United
States, abortion providers are already subject to strict regulations
that ensure patient safety.106
Despite these laws intending to effectuate a state’s interest in
preserving patient health and safety, there is much debate as to
whether the requirements actually further said interest.107 Less
than 0.5% of abortion patients have a complication resulting in
hospitalization, and if complications do arise there is the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”) that
requires the patient to be treated at a hospital.108 With these
regulations already in place, it does not seem fair to suggest that
TRAP laws serve the purpose or interest in which the states suggest
they do.109 In fact, TRAP laws have the effect of discouraging
101. Id. at 2127; Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313.
102. Lisa M. Brown, Esq., The Trap: Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Providers,
NAT’L
ABORTION
FED’N
(2007),
www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_abortion/trap
_laws.pdf [perma.cc/ZGP2-3KDH].
103. Id.
104. See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2020), www.guttmacher.org/evidence-you-canuse/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers-trap-laws [perma.cc/W7PM-PQNA]
[hereinafter GUTTMACHER INST.] (stating that TRAP laws “set standards that
are intended to be difficult, if not impossible, for providers to meet”).
105. Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain Political
Traction While Abortion Clinics—and the Women They Serve—Pay the
Price, GUTTMACHER
POL’Y
REV.
(June
25,
2013), www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2013/06/trap-laws-gain-political-tractionwhile-abortion-clinics-and-women-they-serve-pay-price
[perma.cc/5FQDEJVB].
106. Id. Abortion providers are already subject to regulations such as state
licensing requirements, federal workplace safety requirements, and medical
ethics. Id.
107. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 104 (stipulating that admitting
privileges does not actually further any compelling state interests but rather
inhibit and burden access to abortion by forcing abortion providers to quit
providing their services because they cannot obtain these privileges).
108. Id.; see Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 USC 1395dd.
(indicating that a hospital must treat a patient who comes in with major
complications, including abortion patients); Ushma D. Upadhyay, Incidence of
Emergency Department Visits and Complications after Abortion, 125 AM. COLL.
OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS 175, 175-83 (Jan. 2015).
109. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 104 (detailing that admitting
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abortion providers from offering services and make access to these
services extremely burdensome.110 As of 2007, thirty-four states had
some type of TRAP law. As TRAP laws become more prevalent and
continue building off one another, it will become increasingly
difficult for providers to perform abortion services and for clinics to
remain open.111 These laws remain a major challenge against a
woman’s right to choose and for the legal future of the abortion
right.

E. A Brief Introduction to June Medical Services L.L.C.
v. Russo
Russo is one of the most recent cases testing the Court’s
willingness to protect a woman’s implied fundamental right to
choose against a state’s interest in women’s health and potentiality
of life.112 It also tested the Court’s willingness to do so in front of
President Trump’s appointments to the Supreme Court.113
Abortion clinics and providers brought the action against the
State of Louisiana with the purpose of barring the enforcement of
Louisiana’s Unsafe Abortion Protection Act (“Act 620”).114 Act 620
required that all Louisiana abortion providers obtain admitting
privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the location where
they perform abortions.115 It was almost identical to the Texas
statute that the Court struck down three years prior in
Hellerstedt.116 Just like in Hellerstedt, the district court did not find
privilege requirements are often used as TRAP laws designed to burden and
end access to abortion services).
110. See Gold & Nash, supra note 105 (describing the difficulty for abortion
providers to obtain these privileges and the direct effect this difficulty has on
clinic closures and the decrease of providers supplying abortion services).
111. Id.; see GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 104 (providing statistics and
information on how regulations requiring abortion providers to obtain hospital
admitting privileges is forcing clinic closures and providers to quit performing
abortion services).
112. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2112.
113. Emma Green, What the Supreme Court’s Abortion Decision Means,
ATLANTIC
(June
29,
2020),
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/06/supreme-court-abortiontrump/613642/ [perma.cc/P82V-PEXM]; see Dan Mangan, supra note 3
(suggesting that Donald Trump’s purpose in nominating Supreme Court
Justices during his presidency was to lead to the future overturning of Roe).
114. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2113; see La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (West
2020) (requiring that all abortion providers on the date that abortion is
performed have acting admitting privileges at a hospital that is located within
thirty miles of the place where the abortion is taking place).
115. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (West 2020).
116. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292; see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
171.0031(a) (West 2020) (demonstrating how the Texas regulation the Court
struck down three years previous is almost identical to the admitting privileges
requirement that Louisiana is attempting to establish in their statute).
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the admitting privileges requirement to offer any significant health
benefits, but instead found they would continue to make it
impossible for providers to gain privileges because “hospitals may
deny privileges or decline to consider an application for privileges
for myriad reasons unrelated to competency.”117 The court also
found that the enforcement of Act 620 would leave Louisiana with
only one abortion provider and clinic to serve the needs of all
Louisiana women looking to exercise their rights.118 The district
court found that Act 620 created an undue burden on women
seeking to exercise their right to choose and permanently enjoined
the enforcement of Act 620.119
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit found in favor of the state of
Louisiana, finding that requiring admitting privileges would not
burden access to abortion in the state.120 The Fifth Circuit stated
that the district court overlooked that the facts were different from
Hellerstedt.121 The Fifth Circuit found that there was only one
provider and clinic which would be forced to quit providing abortion
services, and a substantial amount of Louisiana would not be
affected.122 Additionally, it found that Act 620 created an important
credentialing function that would ensure and check the competency
of all abortion providers.123 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the benefits of Act 620 outweighed the burdens on Louisiana
women looking to exercise their rights and, ultimately, dismissed
the action.124
The plaintiff abortion providers, June Medical Services,
appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.125 Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority of the Court, used the undue burden

117. June Med. Serv. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 46-7 (M.D. La.,
2017) (finding that hospitals may deny the required privileges based on reasons
that have nothing to do with the states’ interest in protecting maternal and
women’s health, such as the provider’s expected use of the hospital and
admitting privileges, the provider’s location of living and abortion practice, and
a hospital’s moral mission against abortion).
118. See id. at 80 (finding that a substantial number of Louisiana women
will be denied access to an abortion because a single physician cannot meet the
demand of performing 10,000 abortions per year).
119. See id. at 87 (demonstrating that the Louisiana statute will result in a
drastic reduction in the number and geographic distribution of abortion
providers, reducing the number of clinics to one, and leaving only one physician
providing abortions to the entire State of Louisiana).
120. June Med. Serv. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 811 (5th Cir. 2018).
121. Gee, 905 F.3d at 791 (stipulating that, compared to the facts
surrounding the Texas law in Hellerstedt, the Louisiana Act would only prevent
one abortion provider from offering services, and therefore it would not burden
access to abortion in the state).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 805.
124. Id.
125. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2132.
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standard developed in Casey126 to weigh the law’s “asserted benefits
against the burdens” it imposed on Louisiana women.127 The Court
decided that the admitting privileges requirement imposed a
substantial obstacle for Louisiana women looking to exercise their
right to an abortion, finding that the burdens heavily outweighed
the benefits.128 The abortion right was overall protected in Russo,
but four of the justices, Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh, dissented to the majority opinion, including the
concurring justice, Chief Justice Roberts.129 The dissents and
concurring opinion opened up more criticism, skepticism, and
uncertainty for future legal decisions on this controversial issue.
Because the Court once again could not unanimously agree that a
burdensome state regulation was unconstitutional, the abortion
right was left vulnerable to the attacks of conservative legislatures
looking to overturn the abortion right.130 This decision can be
regarded as a win for the pro-choice movement, but the Court left
the abortion right with the same uncertain legal future as Roe.

III. JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L.L.C. V. RUSSO: THE
COURT’S ANALYSIS
In June 2020, the Supreme Court finally analyzed the Texas
abortion law, and the findings will be discussed in this section.131 In
terms of procedure, five months after the Texas admitting privileges
requirement examined in Hellerstedt closed half of Texas’s abortion
clinics, the State of Louisiana attempted to enforce Act 620.132 The
126. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
127. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2112 (quoting Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310).
128. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2127 (finding that the minimal health benefits
imposed by the statute were heavily outweighed by the significant closures of
almost all abortion clinics in the state bringing about substantial burdening
effects on Louisiana women looking to access their decisional abortion right).
129. Id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 2142 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2171(Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2181 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
130. See Caroline Kitchener, State legislatures got redder in 2020. It’s a ‘dire
reality’ for abortion rights, advocates say, LILY (Feb. 2, 2021),
www.thelily.com/state-legislatures-got-redder-in-2020-its-a-dire-reality-forabortion-rights-advocates-say/ [perma.cc/Y328-UQY4] (detailing how a
majority of states now have anti-abortion majorities within their legislatures,
including in South Carolina where the legislature developed a bill that bans
abortions once a provider can detect a fetal heartbeat); see Ellman, supra note
17 (stipulating that the June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo Court
maintained “a status quo in which hundreds of abortion restrictions remain in
place across the country”).
131. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
132. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (West 2020) (requiring that all
abortion providers on the date that abortion is performed have acting admitting
privileges at a hospital that is located within thirty miles of the place where the
abortion is taking place).
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respondent State argued that Act 620 was a valid regulation under
Tenth Amendment police powers because of its purpose to protect
women’s health and safety.133 Five abortion clinics and four
abortion providers brought suit against the State of Louisiana to
block the enforcement of Louisiana’s Act 620 because it imposed an
undue burden on women’s right to an abortion.134
The plaintiffs asked the district court for a preliminary
injunction to prevent Act 620 and its penalties from taking effect.135
The court granted the motion and banned the state from imposing
the penalties on the plaintiff providers and clinics, while directing
the plaintiffs to attempt to seek privileges and to update the court
on their progress.136 A few months later, the court met for a six-day
bench trial to hear the testimony of the individual plaintiff
physicians and clinics on their progress of attempting to obtain
admitting privileges.137 The district court declared Act 620
unconstitutional, finding that the law offered no significant health
benefits and the admitting privileges requirement made it
impossible for abortion providers to obtain these privileges, all of
which in effect placed a substantial obstacle in the way of a
Louisiana woman seeking an abortion.138 The Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court decision, agreeing with the application of the
court’s undue burden standard, but finding the factual
determinations clearly erroneous.139
A majority of the Supreme Court, consisting of the plurality
and concurrence written by the Chief Justice found in favor of the
plaintiff abortion providers and clinics and struck down the
Louisiana law as imposing an undue burden on abortion access in
Louisiana.140 But this decision was met with much dissent by
Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, making this
case’s outcome controversial.141
Part A of this analysis will analyze Justice Breyer’s plurality
opinion finding that Act 620 imposed a substantial obstacle on
access to abortion and is unconstitutional. Part B will analyze Chief
Justice Robert’s concurrence also finding that Act 620 is
unconstitutional. Part C will analyze the dissenting opinions
133. Kliebert, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 505.
134. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2113.
135. Kliebert, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 486.
136. Id. at 536.
137. Id. at 517 (informing that there were no material changes in status of
any of the six abortion providers applications or in their attempts to obtain
admitting privileges at hospitals throughout Louisiana).
138. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 87.
139. Gee, 905 F. Supp. 3d at 815.
140. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2132.
141. Id. at 2142-53 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2153-71 (Alito, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2171-82 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
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arguing that Act 620 should have been upheld because it does not
constitute an undue burden under the Casey undue burden
standard.

A. Plurality Opinion: Act 620 Imposes an Undue
Burden
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and Justice Breyer,
joined by Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, wrote the
plurality opinion reversing the Fifth Circuit and finding in favor of
the plaintiff abortion providers.142 The two issues before the Court
were whether the plaintiff abortion providers and clinics had
standing to bring the action and whether the Fifth Circuit’s decision
to uphold Act 620 and the admitting privileges requirement
conflicted with the Court’s binding precedent in Hellerstedt.143 First,
this section will analyze the plaintiff abortion providers standing.
Second, this section will analyze the Court’s decision to overturn the
Fifth Circuit because (1) it burdened abortion providers by forcing
them to stop providing abortion services, and (2) Act 620 conferred
no benefits and did nothing to further the state’s purported
interests in maternal health and safety.
1. Whether the Plaintiff Abortion Provider’s Lacked
Standing
The state raised its argument that the plaintiff abortion
providers and clinics lacked standing to challenge Act 620 for the
first time in its cross-petition for certiorari.144 The plaintiff abortion
providers brought this action to challenge Act 620 with the purpose
of protecting their patients’ rights on the grounds that the Act
diminished their right to undergo an abortion.145 The state argued
that a party cannot “rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third-parties.”146 During the district court proceedings,
the state clearly articulated that “there is no question that the
physicians had standing to contest the law,” and that the Fifth
Circuit has upheld abortion provider third-party standing for a

142. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2132.
143. Id. at 2117, 2120-21.
144. Reply Brief for Respondent/Cross Petitioner at 23, June Med. Serv.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 2020 WL 996893 (2020), (Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460); Russo, 140 S.
Ct. at 2117-18.
145. Reply Brief for Respondent/Cross Petitioner at 23, June Med. Serv.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 2020 WL 996893 (2020), (Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460); Kliebert, 250
F. Supp. 3d at 87.
146. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 87 (quoting Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S.
125, 129 (2004)) (concluding attorneys lacked third-party standing to conduct
an action on behalf of hypothetical future clients).
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challenge to an admitting privileges law identical to the one in issue
in Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v.
Abbott.147
When the state brought the lack of standing argument to light
for the first time in its cross-petition, it argued that the binding
Fifth Circuit precedent on third-party standing for abortion
providers in Abbott resolved the question only in Texas and not in
Louisiana for the providers in this case.148 The Court did not find
the state’s argument persuasive that the Abbott conclusion of Texas
abortion provider third-party standing did not also apply to the
Louisiana providers.149 Overall, the Court decided that the state’s
allowance of standing in the district court proceedings barred the
consideration of it and evidenced its waiver of the standing
requirements.150 The Court also relied on past precedent evidencing
that abortion providers could invoke the rights of their current or
future patients in challenges to abortion regulations.151 The
plaintiff abortion providers were challenging Act 620 because it
directly affected their conduct and actions as abortion providers.152
Because the abortion providers and clinics in this case faced
penalties and potential loss of license if they practiced without
admitting privileges, the Court found that because the “threatened
imposition of governmental sanctions” existed, their claims and
assertion of their own rights were not abstract.153 The Court also
stated that because of the providers’ personal rights being injured
147. DHH Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Application for Temp.
Restraining Order & for Protective Order at 43-44, June Med. Serv. L.L.C. v.
Gee, 2019 WL 6839847 (2019) (No. 14-cv-525-JWD-RLB); Planned Parenthood
of Greater Texas Surgical Health Serv. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 597-600 (5th
Cir. 2014).
148. Reply Brief for Respondent/Cross Petitioner at 23, June Med. Serv.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 2020 WL 996893 (2020), (No. 18-1323, 18-1460).
149. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2118.
150. Id.; see Reply Brief for Respondent/Cross Petitioner at 23, June Med.
Serv. L.L.C. v. Russo, 2020 WL 996893 (2020), (Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460); Russo,
140 S. Ct. at 2117-18 (evidencing that the state did not raise the lack of standing
claim until five years after it argued that the plaintiff abortion providers and
clinics had the requisite standing to assert the rights of their patients).
151. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2118; see e.g. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2314
(evidencing the Supreme Court allowing abortion providers to bring suit on
behalf of their patients); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007) (four
physicians brought action challenging a Nebraska abortion ban); Casey, 505
U.S. at 845 (abortion clinics and physicians brought action challenging
amendments to the Pennsylvania abortion statute); Doe, 410 U.S. at 188-89
(ruling that the physician appellants had standing to sue, and the issue over
whether they had standing was unnecessary).
152. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2119.
153. Id.; see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (showing that where a
storeowner would face significant economic harm and governmental sanctions
if he did not heed the statutory regulation on alcohol sales, he met the threshold
requirements of a case or controversy and had adequate standing to challenge
the regulation).
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or potentially affected by Act 620, the providers had an incentive to
“resist efforts” restricting their services by acting as advocates for
third-party patients.154 Also, because the admitting privileges
requirement was a direct regulation of the providers’ conduct, they
were in a better position than their patients to bring suit.155
The dissents of Justices Alito and Gorsuch suggested that the
lack of standing in this case was different because providers were
challenging a law enacted to protect the patients whose rights they
were attempting to assert.156 The plurality found this argument
irrelevant because this is an ordinary feature in precedent where
third-party standing was satisfied.157 This case was also not the
first time third-party standing had been addressed in the abortion
context.158 In conclusion, the Court found that the state ultimately
waived the third-party standing issue, and even if it did not,
precedent supported that the abortion providers and clinics had
adequate standing to assert their own and their patients’ rights
against Act 620.159
2. The Fifth Circuit Should be Reversed and Act 620 is
Unconstitutional
The second issue in front of the Court was whether the Fifth
Circuit was wrong in its decision on Act 620’s effects on Louisiana
women looking to exercise their right to choose.160 Justice Breyer
relied on the standard set forth in Casey and Hellerstedt declaring
that “a statute which, while furthering [a] valid state interest has
the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its
154. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2119.
155. Id.; see Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976) (evidencing that
abortion providers are “uniquely qualified” to challenge a state’s regulation on
abortion and burdening of a woman’s decision to exercise her right to choose).
156. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2166-67 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2174 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 2119; Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-200.
158. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2120; Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2311 (plaintiff
abortion providers and clinics brought suit against the state of Texas for an
admitting privileges requirement that was enacted for the purpose of patient
safety had third-party standing); Doe, 410 U.S. at 195 (plaintiff abortion
providers who challenged a state regulation requiring a hospital accreditation
requirement for the benefit of ensuring patient safety and provider competence
had standing).
159. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2120; see Reply Brief for Respondent/Cross
Petitioner at 23, June Med. Serv. L.L.C. v. Russo, 2020 WL 996893 (U.S. 2020),
(Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460) (waiving the standing issue and clearly stating that the
abortion providers had standing to sue on behalf of their patients); Russo, 140
S. Ct. at 2117-18 (evidencing the state waiving the standing issue and clearly
articulating that the plaintiff abortion providers had third-party standing in
this case).
160. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2120-21.
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legitimate ends” and “unnecessary health regulations impose an
unconstitutional undue burden if they have the purpose or effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
abortion.”161 Justice Breyer emphasized that a court must “consider
the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws confer” and that legislative factfinding must be
reviewed under a deferential standard.162 Justice Breyer then
explained that the Court found in Hellerstedt that the district court
appropriately applied these standards, much like the district court
in this case.163
Justice Breyer then addressed the Fifth Circuit’s disagreement
with the factual findings of the district court.164 He stated that the
district court findings of fact “whether based on oral or other
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the
reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity
to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”165 He recited that an appellate
court does not decide factual issues de novo, but where the district
court’s findings are plausible the court of appeals “may not reverse
it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact,
it would have weighed the evidence differently.”166 “A finding that
is ‘plausible’ in light of the full record—even if another is equally or
more so—must govern.”167
The Justice then addressed the dissenter’s suggestion that a
less deferential standard should be applied because Act 620 was
enjoined before it was enforced and that the claims were
premature.168 He disagreed with the dissenters stating that there
161. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78).
162. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2324; id. at 2310 (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S.
at 165).
163. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2120 (stating that the district courts in Hellerstedt
and here “considered the evidence in the record—including expert evidence,
presented in stipulations, depositions, and testimony” then “weighed the
asserted benefits of the law against the burdens it imposed on abortion
access”).
164. Id. (explaining that the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District
Court, not so much in respect to the legal standards that were set forth, but
because it did not agree with the factual findings on which the District Court
relied in assessing both the burdens that Act 620 imposes and the healthrelated benefits it might bring).
165. Id. at 2121 (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a)(6).).
166. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2121 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
564, 573-73 (1985)).
167. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2121 (quoting Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455,
1465 (2017)).
168. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2121; see id. at 2158-59 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(arguing that because Act 620 was enjoined before it was put into effect, the
district court’s fact finding should not be owed so much deference); id. at 217678 (Gorsuch J., dissenting) (suggesting a more deferential standard should be
applied for the appellate court to review the factual findings of the district court
de novo because the admitting privileges requirement was enjoined before the
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was no authority suggesting that appellate scrutiny of factual
determinations varies with the timing of a plaintiff's lawsuit or a
trial court's decision.169 He further argued that the plaintiffs’ claims
were not premature because Act 620’s sanctions were suspended,
but the physicians were still required to attempt efforts at obtaining
admitting privileges.170 Justice Breyer expressed his view that the
district court based its findings on “real-world evidence, not
speculative guesswork,” and there was no basis for departing from
the normal standard applying to findings of fact.171 Justice Breyer
agreed with the district court’s ultimate conclusion that “even if Act
620 could be said to further women's health to some marginal
degree, the burdens it imposes far outweigh any such benefit, and
thus the Act imposes an unconstitutional undue burden.”172

B. The District Court’s Substantial Obstacle
Determination
Justice Breyer then considered the district court’s finding that
the enforcement of Act 620 would “result in a drastic reduction in
the number and geographic distribution of abortion providers.”173
He began by first considering the findings on Act 620’s effects on
abortion providers and followed with the act’s impact on abortion
access for Louisiana women.174
1. Act 620’s Effect on Louisiana Abortion Providers
Justice Breyer commenced by stating that the Court in
Hellerstedt found that the plaintiff abortion providers satisfied their
burden of proving that the admitting privileges law caused the
closure of clinics through the direct testimony of physicians who
testified that they were unable to obtain these privileges.175 The
Court decided, based on submissions of amici in the medical
profession, that because abortions are so safe, the providers would
be unlikely to obtain or maintain these privileges in which many
hospitals conditioned on the physicians admitting a certain number
act went into effect).
169. Id. at 2121.
170. Id.; see id. at 2114 (signifying that because Act 620 was not fully
enjoined, the plaintiff abortion providers were still required by the Court to
obtain the admitting privileges Act 620 required).
171. Id. at 2121.
172. Id. (quoting Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 88).
173. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2122 (quoting Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 87-88).
174. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2122; see id. at 2115-16 (finding that Does 1, 2 and
6 would be prevented from providing abortions if the act was enforced, and that
it would prevent Doe 5 from working in his Baton Rouge clinic, only allowing
him to work in the New Orleans clinic).
175. Id.; Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313.
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of patients per year.176 This included the fact that many hospitals
had common prerequisites to obtaining these privileges that had
nothing to do with physician competency.177 The Hellerstedt Court
found that the admitting privileges requirement had a substantial
effect of causing the closure of many Texas clinics.178
Justice Breyer found the evidence in this case stronger than in
Hellerstedt and suggested that the Act would have a drastic effect
on Louisiana abortion providers.179 Here, the district court
supervised the efforts of Does 1, 2, 5, and 6 for over a year and a
half in attempting, and failing, to acquire the admitting
privileges.180 The court also heard direct evidence that some of the
physicians’ applications for privileges were denied for reasons
unrelated to their competency.181 He argued that this evidence
showed that unless the abortion providers also maintained OB/GYN
practices, Louisiana providers were unlikely to have in-hospital
experience to meet the preconditions for obtaining privileges.182
Justice Breyer argued that the evidence also showed that even
if the providers could initially obtain the privileges, they would be
unable to maintain them for failing to use them.183 He believed that
the experience of Doe 6 was dispositive.184 Doe 6 was a boardcertified OB/GYN with fifty years’ experience. Doe 6 provided only
medically necessary abortions, and of the thousands of women he
had served over the ten years prior to the district court’s decision,
only two patients required admission to the hospital.185 Based on
these facts, Justice Breyer argued that this safety record would
176. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2312 (stating the likely effect of such
requirements was that abortion providers “would be unable to maintain
admitting privileges or obtain those privileges for the future, because the fact
that abortions are so safe meant that providers were unlikely to have any
patients to admit,” including “for example, requirements that doctors have
“treated a high number of patients in the hospital setting in the past year,
clinical data requirements, residency requirements, and other discretionary
factors”).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2313.
179. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2122.
180. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 77-78.
181. Id. at 68-70, 76-77; see Brief for Medical Staff Professionals as Amici
Curiae at 11-30. June Med. Serv. L.L.C. v. Russo (2020). No. 18-1323, No. 181460 (showing the direct testimony and evidence that Louisiana hospitals
commonly deny applications for admitting privileges for reasons unrelated to
competency).
182. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2123 (relying on evidence such as Doe 2, who is a
board-certified OB/GYN with forty years’ experience, testified that he had not
done any in-hospital work in ten years and only two patients within the last five
years had to be admitted to the hospital, and as a result was unable to comply
with one hospital’s conditions for admitting privileges).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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“make it impossible to maintain privileges at any of the many
Louisiana hospitals that require newly appointed physicians to
undergo a process of ‘focused professional practice evaluation,’ in
which they are observed by hospital staff as they perform inhospital procedures.”186 And it would also disqualify Doe 6 from
maintaining privileges at hospitals that require a minimum
number of patient admissions.187
Justice Breyer further argued that there was evidence that
suggested that opposition to abortion played a large role in some
hospitals’ choice to deny privileges.188 Some hospitals expressly
barred anyone with privileges from performing abortions while
some other hospitals were averse to granting privileges to abortion
providers “as a matter of discretion.”189 Some hospitals had
preconditions that abortion providers could not satisfy because of
the opposition they faced in Louisiana, such as a requirement that
a provider name a covering physician to serve as a backup if there
was a patient admitted and the provider was unavailable.190 The
district court concluded, “that opposition to abortion can present a
major, if not insurmountable hurdle, for an applicant getting the
required covering physician.”191 Justice Breyer, relying on
Hellerstedt, concluded that the experience of the individual abortion
providers here in failing to obtain the privileges due to reasons
unrelated to their competency supported the district court’s finding
that Act 620’s admitting privileges requirement “serve[d] no
relevant credentialing function.”192
Justice Breyer addressed Justices Alito’s and Gorsuch’s
contention that there was a possibility that new doctors could
replace the physicians.193 He argued that the record supported the
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id; see generally Katelyn Newman, Louisiana Nears 90 Anti-Abortion
Laws, Report Shows, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 12, 2020), www.usnews.com/news/beststates/articles/2020-02-12/louisiana-has-almost-90-anti-abortion-laws-sinceroe-v-wade-report-shows (indicating that opposition to abortion in Louisiana is
known).
189. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2123-24 (relying on Doe 2’s testimony “that he was
told not to bother asking for admitting privileges at University Health in
Shreveport because of his abortion work” and Doe 1’s testimony that he “was
told that his abortion work was an impediment to his application.”).
190. Id. at 2124 (relying on Does 3 and 5’s experience in failing to obtain
admitting privileges at three hospitals because he could not find a covering
physician willing to be associated with an abortion provider).
191. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 49; cf. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313
(evidencing testimony of Texas abortion providers who faced similar challenges
in obtaining privileges because there were no doctors willing to cover for them
due to opposition to abortion in Texas).
192. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2124; Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 87 (quoting
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313).
193. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2158-59 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2176-77
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

146

UIC Law Review

[55:120

district court’s findings that “the same reasons that Does 1, 2, 4, 5,
and 6 have had difficulties getting active admitting privileges,
reasons unrelated to their competence . . . it is unlikely that the
[a]ffected clinics will be able to comply with the Act by recruiting
new physicians who have or can obtain admitting privileges.”194
Therefore, Justice Breyer reasoned that the district court’s findings
that Act 620 would drastically affect Louisiana abortion providers
were correct and that the providers acted in good faith in their
efforts to comply with the act.195
The Court concluded that the Fifth Circuit’s finding that the
providers acted in bad faith when failing to obtain admitting
privileges was erroneous because it used the wrong standard of
review.196 The law required the Fifth Circuit to review the district
court’s findings under the clear-error standard.197 Justice Breyer
believed that the district court’s decision was not erroneous and
“[w]hen the record is examined in light of the appropriately
deferential standard, it is apparent that it contain[ed] nothing that
mandates a finding that the District Court's conclusion was clearly
erroneous.”198 There were no facts or evidence that indicated that
the physicians acted in bad faith.199 Relying on Hellerstedt, Justice
Breyer found that the testimony and efforts of the physicians met
the burden of proving that Act 620 had a burdensome effect on the
Louisiana abortion providers, much like the statute in Hellerstedt
had on the Texas physicians.200
2. Act 620’s Impact on Abortion Access
Justice Breyer then introduced the district court’s findings that
Act 620 would place substantial obstacles in the way of women
seeking to exercise their rights to an abortion in Louisiana.201 He
began by emphasizing the significance of the geographic
distribution of the Louisiana providers and clinics.202 At the time of
the district court’s decision, there were three abortion clinics and
six abortion providers in the state.203 But if Act 620 was to be

194. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2128; Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 82.
195. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2122-28.
196. Id. at 2124; Gee, 905 F. 3d at 807.
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 577).
199. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2125-28.
200. Id.; Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313.
201. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2130.
202. Id. at 2128-29; see Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 40-41, 80-81 (evidencing
Figures 1 and 2 displaying the geographical distribution of Louisiana abortion
providers and clinics at the time of the district court’s decision and the projected
distribution of abortion clinics and providers following the enforcement of Act
620).
203. See Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 40-1 (representing Figure 1 and the
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enforced, the district court concluded that Does 1, 2, and 6 would be
eliminated due to their inability to obtain admitting privileges.204
This elimination would leave Louisiana with one clinic and provider
(Doe 5) to serve the 10,000 women who annually seek to exercise
their right to an abortion in the state.205 The district court also
found that Doe 5 would only be able to absorb, at most, thirty
percent of the demand for abortion in the state, and because Doe 5
does not perform abortions beyond eighteen weeks, pregnant
women between eighteen weeks and the state legal limit of twenty
weeks would have little or no way to exercise their constitutional
right to an abortion.206
Justice Breyer agreed that Act 620 would force burdens on
abortion access in the state and cause “longer waiting times and
increased crowding.”207 He thought the district court’s finding that
the closure of the clinics would impact Louisiana with many
burdens on the access to abortions was reasonable.208 The burdens
found by the district court included an increased risk that a woman
would experience complications from the procedure209 and
increased driving distances for women living far from the last
remaining clinic.210 In conclusion, Justice Breyer relied on the
factual similarities of the Texas law in question in Hellerstedt to
find that Louisiana’s Act 620 would place a substantial obstacle in
the way of women seeking access to abortion in Louisiana.
Next, Justice Breyer addressed the asserted benefits that the
state suggested Act 620 conferred.211 The district court found the
act to have “no significant health-related problem that the new law
helped to cure.”212 Justice Breyer argued that this finding was not
distribution of clinics and providers offering abortion services in Louisiana prior
to the enforcement of Act 620); see id. at 79 (evidencing the district court’s
finding that Doe 3 would stop performing abortions if he was the last provider
in northern Louisiana).
204. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 80-1 (illustrating that if Act 620 was
enforced, Louisiana would have been left with at most two clinics and two
abortion providers to perform abortion services for the whole state).
205. Id. at 80-1, 87-8 (relying on the fact that Doe 3 would likely quit
providing abortion services because of his testimony that he would stop if he
was the only provider left in Northern Louisiana, leaving only Doe 5 to provide
abortion services in the entire State of Louisiana).
206. Id.
207. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2129-30 (quoting Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313)
(suggesting that the closure of clinics in Texas caused many burdens to impact
and impede a Texas women’s access to their right to an abortion).
208. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2129-30.
209. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 82.
210. Id. at 88 (finding that “many women will have to travel much longer
distances to reach the few providers who will continue to provide abortions, and
that travel will impose severe burdens, which will fall most heavily on lowincome women”); La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.10(D).
211. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2130.
212. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 86 (quoting Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2311)
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clearly erroneous for two reasons.213 The first reason was that the
record supported the district court’s conclusion that the admitting
privileges requirement served no “relevant credentialing
function.”214 He contended that the evidence proved that hospitals
can, and did, deny admitting privileges for reasons unrelated to a
physician’s competency.215 The district court found that while
competency is one factor in the decision to grant admitting
privileges, “hospitals primarily focus upon a doctor's ability to
perform the inpatient, hospital-based procedures for which the
doctor seeks privileges—not outpatient abortions.”216 Additionally,
there was nothing in the record that indicated that the background
review for admitting privileges added anything significant to the
review that the State Board of Medical Examiners already
maintained for abortion providers.217
The second reason the district court’s findings were not
erroneous was that it found that the law did “not conform to
prevailing medical standards and [would] not improve the safety of
abortion in Louisiana.”218 Much like Hellerstedt, the evidence and
testimony suggested that the law conferred no actual health benefit
for the abortion patients and did not further the states’ interest in
women’s health or safety.219 The Justice argued that the state
introduced no evidence suggesting that patients were better off
when their physicians possessed admitting privileges or that the
privileges would help even one woman receive better treatment.220
It was concluded that Act 620’s admitting privileges requirement
conferred no health benefits for abortion patients, and based on the
standard set forth in Casey and Hellerstedt, the act was therefore
unconstitutional.221
(finding that Act 620 “[d]oes [n]ot [p]rotect [w]omen's [h]ealth, provides no
significant health benefits, and makes no improvement to women's health
compared to prior law”).
213. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2131.
214. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d at 87 (quoting Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313).
215. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2131 (finding additionally that Act 620’s
requirement that abortion providers obtain admitting privileges at a hospital
within thirty miles from the place they perform abortions “further constrains
providers for reasons that bear no relationship to competence”).
216. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d at 46.
217. Id. at 87.
218. Id. at 64.
219. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2131-32.
220. Id. at 2132; Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d at 64.
221. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2133; see Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78) (evidencing the standard set forth in Casey and
Hellerstedt that “a statute which, while furthering [a] valid state interest has
the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice
cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends” and
that “unnecessary health regulations impose an unconstitutional undue burden
if they have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a
woman seeking an abortion”).
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In sum, the plurality concluded that the district court’s
findings on the burdens and benefits conferred by Act 620 had
ample evidentiary support and were not clearly erroneous.222
Overall, the plurality held that the Court must uphold the district
court’s finding that Louisiana’s Act 620 imposed an undue burden
on a woman’s right to choose in violation of the constitution.223
Justice Breyer contended that this case was nearly identical to
Hellerstedt and that it was necessary to reach the same conclusion
that Act 620 was unconstitutional.224 The Fifth Circuit’s decision
was erroneous and Act 620 placed an undue burden on a Louisiana
woman’s right to an abortion.225

C. Chief Justice Roberts’s Concurrence
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurrence,226 but he only found
in favor of the abortion providers and clinics based on stare
decisis.227 He stated that because the Louisiana law imposed a
“burden on access to abortion just as severe as that imposed by the
Texas law” in Hellerstedt, Act 620 could not stand under the Court’s
precedent.228 Chief Justice Roberts inquired that the Hellerstedt
undue burden standard used in this case was not correct.229 He did
not agree that Casey suggested that it is a court’s job to weigh the
benefits with the burdens of abortion regulation.230 Instead, Chief
Justice Roberts suggested that Casey focused on the “existence of a
substantial obstacle” which is what judges should analyze
instead.231 The benefits of regulation should “not be placed on a
scale opposite the law’s burdens,” but instead should be considered
in the assessment of the state’s interest and the means the state
took to meet that goal.232 He argued that the only place in Casey
where a balancing test was suggested was in Justice Steven’s
222. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2133.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2133-34 (Roberts, C. J., concurring).
227. Id. at 2134 (stating “the legal doctrine of stare decisis requires us,
absent special circumstances, to treat like cases alike.”); Ian Millhiser, Why
conservative Chief Justice Roberts just struck down an anti-abortion law, VOX
(June 29, 2020), www.vox.com/2020/6/29/21306895/supreme-court-abortionchief-justice-john-roberts-stephen-breyer-june-medical-russo [perma.cc/UGR7TPBJ] (suggesting that the Chief Justice did not uphold the abortion right, but
rather indicated to future litigants how to destroy it).
228. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2134.
229. Id. at 2135-36.
230. Id. at 2136 (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163) (stating that Casey clearly
suggested that states and legislatures have discretion to pass regulations “in
areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty”).
231. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2136.
232. Id. at 2138 (relying on Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
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partial dissent, which “did not win the day.”233 Chief Justice Roberts
believed that because both Hellerstedt and the plurality in this case
stated that they were using the undue burden standard from Casey,
the Court should have respected the standard and assessed solely
for a substantial obstacle before striking the regulations, therefore
suggesting that the plurality used the wrong test altogether.234 His
concurrence concluded that the plurality was wrong in considering
the benefits in their analysis of whether the regulation was
constitutional.235
Next, the Chief Justice declared that Act 620 was nearly
identical to the Texas law in Hellerstedt.236 Prior to the enactment
of Act 620 and the Texas law in Hellerstedt, both Texas and
Louisiana were required to either have a transfer agreement or
admitting privileges with a hospital.237 And both, notwithstanding
the prior laws, eliminated the option for a transfer agreement for
abortion providers.238 In Texas, the new law had the effect of
drastically reducing the number and distribution of abortion
providers.239 Similarly, in Louisiana, if the new law would have
been enforced, Louisiana would have been left with one clinic to
serve the whole state.240 Chief Justice Roberts identified more
similarities between Hellerstedt and Russo, such as the enforcement
of both the Texas and Louisiana laws causing there to be fewer
doctors, “longer waiting times, and increased crowding.”241 He also
agreed that in both cases, common conditions for obtaining
admitting privileges that had nothing to do with physician
competency made obtaining these privileges increasingly
difficult.242 Taking these similarities into consideration, he stated
233. Id.; see generally Casey, 505 U.S. at 916-20.
234. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2139.
235. Id. (stating that in neither this case, Hellerstedt, nor Casey was there
reason to consider a regulation’s benefits).
236. Id.
237. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.56(a) (2009); 48 LA. ADMIN. CODE §
4407(A)(3) (2003), 29 La. Reg. 706-707 (2003) (examining how both Texas and
Louisiana already had laws in place that allowed for either a transfer
agreement or an admitting privilege requirement).
238. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a)(1)(A) (West 2022);
LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (2022) (comparing the two new attempted
Texas and Louisiana laws that no longer allowed for abortion providers to have
either a transfer agreement nor an admitting privileges requirement).
239. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 681.
240. Gee, 250 F. 3d at 87 (demonstrating that at the time of the district court
proceedings, there were three clinics and five providers, but if the new law was
enacted, the number of clinics would be “reduced to one, or at most two,” and
the number of physicians would be reduced to “one, or at most two”).
241. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313; Gee, 250 F. 3d at 81.
242. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313-14 (providing those common
requisites included residency, clinical data requirements, and sometimes
conditioned privileges on reaching a certain number of hospital admissions per
year); see also Gee, 250 F. 3d at 46 (showing that in Louisiana competency is
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that he believed the factual findings of the district court could not
be disturbed because there was no clear error.243 Based upon the
similarities, the Chief Justice reiterated the fact that stare decisis
forced him and the Court into following Hellerstedt,244 but also
emphasized that he did not agree with the Hellerstedt holding.245

D. Dissenting Opinions: Act 620 Does Not Impose an
Undue Burden
This section will address the main issues brought forth by the
dissenting justices. First, this section will explain the dissenter’s
opinion that the plaintiff abortion providers here lacked standing to
assert the rights of their patients. Next, the dissenters argued that
Act 620 was constitutional because it furthered the state’s interests
in maternal health and safety. Then, the dissenters asserted that
the plurality applied the wrong standard of review to this case.
Further, this section will address the argument that stare decisis is
inappropriate in this case. Finally, this section will address the
dissenters' opinion that the plurality wrongly granted deference to
the district court’s findings of fact which they thought were clearly
erroneous.
1. Issue of Plaintiff Abortion Provider’s Standing
A majority of the dissenting justices argued that the plaintiff
abortion providers lacked standing to assert their rights in this
case.246 Justice Thomas argued that the abortion providers lacked
standing because parties should not be able to bring suit to assert
the rights of third-parties.247 Instead, he believed that no
established Court precedent allowed third-party standing and,
therefore, the abortion providers should have never been able to
bring suit.248 Justice Thomas contended that a substantive due
process right to an abortion is an inherently personal and private
right belonging wholly to the women making the decisional choice
to undergo an abortion and not the providers or clinics providing
the abortion services.249 Therefore, the plaintiff abortion providers

only one factor hospitals consider and that they can deny privileges or deny
consideration of a physician’s application for reasons that have nothing to do
with competency).
243. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2141. (Roberts, C. J., concurring).
244. Id. at 2142.
245. Id. at 2133.
246. Id. at 2142 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2165 (Alito, J., dissenting);
id. at 2173 (Gorsuch J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2142 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 2143.
249. Id.
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and clinics could not establish a personal legal injury through the
rights of their patients.250 According to the justice, the only injuries
the abortion providers and clinics could argue here is the possibility
of criminal sanctions that would demonstrate only real world
damages and no legal injury,251and they therefore lacked
standing.252
Justice Alito also agreed that the abortion providers here
lacked standing.253 He argued that there was a substantial conflict
of interest between the abortion providers who had a financial
interest in circumventing Act 620’s admitting privileges
requirement while the patients seeking abortions had an interest in
the protection of their health and safety, therefore barring
standing.254 He asserted that when abortion regulations were
enacted to protect the health and safety of patients, a provider or
clinic should not be able to invoke the rights of the women, but
rather only rely on their own rights.255
Further, Justice Alito argued against standing using a test
that required a plaintiff to demonstrate (1) closeness to the thirdparty, and (2) a hindrance to the third-party’s ability to bring suit.256
Neither of the prongs was met under his analysis because (1) a
woman who obtains an abortion did not develop a close relationship
with the provider performing the procedure but instead their
relationship was brief and limited,257 and (2) there was nothing
hindering women from bringing suit in these cases, such as using
pseudonyms or other precautions to avoid revealing their identity
and the mootness exception of capable-of-repetition-yet-evadingreview.258 Because this case involved abortion providers and clinics
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2149; see generally Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288, 302-03
(1846) (demonstrating that an actual legal injury, a wrong done to a person, or
a violation of a right, has to be done in order for the Article III standard of a
case or controversy to be met).
252. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2149 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 2165 (Alito, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 2166.
255. Id. at 2166-67; see Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S.
1, 9, 15 n. 7 (2004) (signifying that a father and daughter had a conflict of
interest that prevented third-party standing when the father asserted his
daughter’s right not to hear others recite the words “under God” because the
Court held that the interests of the father and the child were not the same.
Justice Alito relies on this to show that third-party standing cannot be asserted
when there is a conflict of interest).
256. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2166-67; Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129-30.
257. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2168 (relying on the facts that in Louisiana a
woman may meet her physician the day before her abortion procedure, or even
the day of the procedure, the meeting consists of the provider informing the
woman what they will do, answering any questions and informing the woman
about the progress of the procedure, and in addition, the procedure usually only
takes a few minutes).
258. Id. at 2168-69 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 125) (justifying pregnancy as a
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attempting to assert the rights of their patients against a law
enacted for their protection creating a conflict of interest, Justice
Alito contended that the factors in this case weighed against
adhering to precedent and in favor of overruling.259 Justice Alito
stated that the plurality’s decision here and the Court’s decision in
Hellerstedt allowing third-party standing to abortion providers
when a conflict of interest is present twisted the law.260
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent argued that none of the justices could
even attempt to suggest the prerequisites of standing were satisfied
here261 because the providers in this case only attempted to assert
the rights of an “undefined, unnamed, indeed unknown, group of
women who they hope will be their patients in the future.”262 He
argued that third-party standing only had been upheld in a narrow
set of cases where the “plaintiff’s interests are aligned with those of
a particular right holder that the litigation will proceed in much the
same way as if the right-holder herself were present” which he does
not find in this case.263 He disagreed with the plurality’s argument
that abortion providers had third-party standing to assert the
rights of their patients because there was a hindrance in the way of
women bringing suit, satisfying the second prong of the test.264
Rather, Justice Gorsuch argued that there were multiple cases
where women have challenged abortion regulations themselves,
indicating no proof of a need for abortion provider third-party
standing.265 He asserted that this case was no different and the
plaintiffs had not carried their burden of proving hindrance.266
Likewise, the plaintiffs’ could not claim they had a close
relationship with the women whose rights they asserted.267 Rather,
Justice Gorsuch argued that the abortion providers didn’t even
know the potential patients and normally, “the fact that the

condition in which is never considered moot).
259. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2170-71 (suggesting that the Chief Justice’s
adherence to precedent and decision to strike down the Louisiana law as
unconstitutional was erroneous because third-party standing has not been met
in this case by the providers).
260. Id. at 2171.
261. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2173 (Gorsuch J., dissenting) (citing Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)) (demonstrating that to satisfy the standing
requirements, a plaintiff must assert an injury to their own legal interests and
not the rights of a third-party not before the court).
262. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2173-74 (suggesting that the plaintiffs’ assertion
that Act 620 would violate their patients’ rights is abstract and hypothetical
because they don’t actually assert the rights of a known and identifiable woman,
or group of women).
263. Id. at 2174.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. (writing “[t]he truth is transparent: The plaintiffs hardly try to carry
their burden of showing a hindrance because they can’t”).
267. Id.
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plaintiffs do not even know who those women are would be enough
to preclude third-party standing.”268
Justice Gorsuch also asserted that the plurality was wrong in
believing the state waived the standing issue because they confused
three legal principles.269 First, he asserted that the state’s
admission to circuit precedent allowing the plaintiffs standing270
reflected, at worst, “a forfeiture of, or a failure to pursue,” an
argument challenging standing, but not a waiver of the argument
or interest in the issue.271 Finally, he concluded that this Court “has
held that even truly forfeited or waived arguments may be
entertained when structural concerns or third-party rights are at
issue[,]” and these conditions are both present in this case.272 In
conclusion, the majority of the dissenting justices believed the
abortion providers and clinics lacked standing to assert their
patients’ rights against a state abortion regulation designed to
further health and safety.273
2. The Dissenting Justices Asserted that Act 620 Served its
Purpose in Promoting the State’s Interests in Protecting
Maternal Health and Safety and Preserving the
Potentiality of Life
The dissenting justices were all in agreement that Act 620
should not have been struck down as unconstitutional.274 Justice
Thomas argued that the plurality and Chief Justice Roberts were
wrong because the “right to abortion is a creation that should be
undone.”275 He stated that the Constitutional right to privacy found
in Griswold v. Connecticut,276 which was utilized in creating the
268. Id. (citing Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 131) (holding that a hypothetical
attorney-client relationship does not satisfy third-party standing); Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) (concluding that a pediatrician lacked standing
to advocate for a state abortion regulation because the fetuses were going to
potentially be his future clients)).
269. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2174-75.
270. See Reply Brief for Respondent/Cross Petitioner, supra note 159
(evidencing the state’s request for the district court to forgo the standing issue
to avoid delaying the judgment on the merits of the plaintiff’s temporary
restraining order motion).
271. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 1275 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (citing Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 878-80 (1991)).
273. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2173; id. at 2149 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at
2165 (Alito, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 2142 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting);
id. at 2171 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
275. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2149 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
implied fundamental right to abortion is not written in the Constitution and is
grounded in the “legal fiction” of substantive due process).
276. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (finding a constitutional implied
fundamental right of privacy found within the penumbras of the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments).
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right to an abortion in Roe, was baseless, mystifying, and should not
be recognized.277 Justice Thomas asserted that the most important
reason that Roe was wrongly decided was that there was nothing in
the text of the Constitution to suggest that a woman’s right to an
abortion is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.278 Relying on
historical tradition, the Justice argued that the right to an abortion
was not within the intent of the framers when ratifying the
Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore could not be a recognized
liberty interest deserving of protection.279 Ultimately, Justice
Thomas did not believe there should be a recognized implied
fundamental right to choose and, therefore, the Court lacked
authority to strike down Act 620.280
Additionally, Justice Alito argued that the plurality’s finding
was erroneous because Act 620 conferred benefits that furthered
the state’s purported interests.281 He argued that the admitting
privileges requirement aimed to protect and preserve maternal
health and safety, and conferred necessary benefits on women
looking to exercise their right to choose.282 He asserted that the
rigorous investigative approach hospitals took in granting
privileges helped to ensure provider competency.283 He argued that
hospitals’ approach went far beyond the review done by the Board
of Medical Examiners and helped to ensure a high degree of
competence from abortion providers, effectively furthering the
state’s interests.284 Justice Alito provided examples from the record
evidencing that some clinics had extremely lenient review processes
to show that this higher standard of competence review was
necessary to protect maternal health and safety.285 Due to this
277. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2149 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
278. Id.
279. See Id. at 2151 (arguing that the abortion right does not deserve 14th
Amendment protection relying on evidence such as that a majority of states and
territories at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment had laws
that limited and nearly banned abortion and the fact that it took the Court over
a century to recognize the right to an abortion).
280. Id. at 2149 (explaining the Court lacked the authority to strike down
Louisiana’s law because it was a valid exercise of the state’s Tenth Amendment
police powers to regulate abortion, in which there should be no implied
fundamental right to).
281. Id. at 2154-55 (Alito, J., dissenting).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 2155 (citing Gee, 905 F.3d at 805) (finding that “hospitals verify
an applicant's surgical ability, training, education, experience, practice record,
and criminal history”).
284. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2156.
285. Id. (such as Doe 3 testifying that they were the only person reviewing
applications at the clinic and they never ran a background check, not even
criminal records; a President of two abortion clinics testifying that he does not
judge a provider’s license, as long as they have a license he claims it is not up
to him to determine if they are capable of providing services; and Doe 4 who
testified that when he was hired he had to produce his license but didn’t have
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evidentiary support, Justice Alito argued that the admitting
privileges requirement of Act 620 had significant health and safety
benefits and served the state’s legitimate interests.286
Justice Gorsuch also argued that Act 620 was constitutional
because the state found that requiring abortion providers to obtain
admitting privileges would protect women’s health and safety.287
Because this Court ordinarily reviewed the factual findings of a
legislature with deference,288 he asserted that the plurality was
wrong in declaring that the law had no health benefits while giving
no deference to the facts that led the legislature to believe
otherwise. 289 He contended that the Court should have taken into
account the legislature’s own factfinding on the benefits conferred
by Act 620 in its decision, but because the Court gave it no
deference, Act 620 should not have been struck down.290
The Justice then stated that the plurality’s assessment of Act
620’s effects on women’s access to abortion was erroneous because
they did not follow the standard that in order to “obtain a
prospective injunction like the one approved today, a plaintiff must
show that irreparable injury was not just possible, but likely.”291 He
claimed that the abortion providers alleged that the enforcement of
the law would significantly harm Louisiana women by making
access to abortion difficult.292 But he argued that it could not be
enough that the law would force any specific physician or clinic to
quit practicing abortion services, but rather they would have to
show that a significant number of facilities would have closed so
that the demand for abortion services in Louisiana could not have
been met.293 Justice Gorsuch asserted that the plurality carelessly
accepted the district court’s assumptions that Act 620 would have
forced physicians to quit providing abortion services in Louisiana.294

to go through any credentialing review).
286. Id. at 2157 (citing Gonzales, 505 U.S. at 163) (stating that when
confronted with a dispute about the benefits of a law, the Court has afforded
legislatures “wide discretion in assessing whether a regulation serves a
legitimate medical need and is medically reasonable even in the face of medical
and scientific uncertainty”).
287. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2172 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. 165-66).
289. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2171-72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 2173.
291. Id.at 2176.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2177 (arguing that the plurality was erroneous in their
acceptance of the district court’s assumptions that if Act 620 was enforced
hospitals would not change its rules to permit abortion providers access to
privileges, clinics would not relocate to a distance within thirty miles of a
hospital, doctors with admitting privileges would not start performing abortions
to meet the demand and that the demand would not persuade an out of state
abortion provider to relocate to Louisiana).
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He believed there to be a possibility that Louisiana hospitals would
have amended their admitting privileges requirements in order to
accommodate abortion providers due to Act 620, which would have
lessened the burden on women’s access to abortion.295
Finally, Justice Kavanaugh dissented because he believed
there needed to be additional fact-finding to properly evaluate Act
620.296 He agreed with Justice Alito that there needed to be more
evidence that the three main doctors in the record could not obtain
admitting privileges and that any of the three abortion clinics in the
state would have been forced to close due to the admitting privileges
requirement.297 Justice Kavanaugh expressed that the Court should
have remanded the case for a new trial using the appropriate legal
standards, effectively opining that he could not decide upon the
constitutionality of Act 629820 at that time.299 A majority of the
dissenting justices argued that Act 620 was constitutional because
the admitting privileges requirement did serve the state’s purpose
in protecting maternal health and safety and, therefore, should
have been found constitutional.
3. The Plurality Applied the Wrong Standard of Review
and, Therefore, Wrongly Decided June Medical Services
L.L.C v. Russo
Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh argued that the
plurality relied on the wrong legal standard for the abortion context
when striking down Act 620. Justice Alito argued that the plaintiff
abortion providers and clinics believed the Court should have used
the standard from Hellerstedt which involved a balancing test.300
295. Id.
296. Id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (evidencing his belief that the
factual record is not sufficient at this stage of plaintiff abortion providers and
clinics facial, pre-enforcement challenge to adequately demonstrate that Does
2, 5, and 6 cannot obtain admitting privileges to comply with Act 620 or that
the law would actually cause the closure of the Louisiana abortion clinics).
297. Id; see generally Isaac Chotiner, What John Robert’s Surprise AbortionRights Ruling Means For The Future Of Roe v. Wade, NEW YORKER (June 29,
2020),
www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/what-john-robertss-surpriseabortion-rights-ruling-means-for-the-future-of-roe-v-wade
[perma.cc/RNN7W5LL] (suggesting that Justice Kavanaugh wanted to see additional facts to
suggest that the Louisiana facts and circumstances were different from
Hellerstedt).
298. Id. at 2153-54 (Alito, J. dissenting); id. at 2179 (Gorsuch J., dissenting);
id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
299. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2182 (alluding to his disagreement with the
plurality opinion over their use of the Hellerstedt standard which he terms the
“cost-benefit” standard).
300. See id. at 2153-54 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the plurality
“eschews the Constitutional test set out in Casey, instead using the erroneous
standard used in Hellerstedt.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, June Med.
Serv. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. (2020) (No. 18-1323, 18-1460).
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But, relying on Casey, Justice Alito stated that when an abortion
law had no negative impact on women, then there was no reason for
the law to face greater scrutiny than a different health or safety
regulation.301 The test the abortion providers and clinics were
advocating for was rejected in Casey and should also have been
rejected here.302 Justice Alito also opined that the Court
misinterpreted Casey in Hellerstedt and used the wrong undue
burden standard for abortion contexts, meaning the Hellerstedt
decision should be overruled, and that the plurality relied on an
erroneous standard.303
Similarly, Justice Gorsuch argued the plurality erroneously
applied a balancing test derived from Hellerstedt to find that Act
620 imposed an undue burden on women’s right to abortion
access.304 He asserted that the plurality’s balancing test did not
provide “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” that
the Court could use to resolve these questions and, therefore, was
inappropriate.305 He contended that the plurality’s balancing test
offered no guidance in resolving cases where there was no clear
resolution, but instead allowed a judge to determine the fate of a
state law based on the balance of benefits and burdens which were
disproportionate.306 Justice Gorsuch stated that the plurality’s use
of their balancing test left lower courts with no “administrable legal
rule to follow, a neutral principle, something outside themselves to
guide their decision” and therefore could not be used.307 Finally,
Justice Kavanaugh also argued that the wrong standard was being
applied by the plurality in evaluating the constitutionality of the
state abortion regulation.308 He asserted that there needed to be
additional fact-finding to properly evaluate Act 620 and that the
Court should have remanded the case for a new trial using the
appropriate legal standards.309 In conclusion, according to these
dissenting justices, the plurality’s decision could not be upheld
301. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2153-54 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Casey, 505
U.S. at 884-85); see generally Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 488 (1955) (“But when a party saddled with such restrictions challenges
them as a violation of due process, our cases call for the restrictions to be
sustained if ‘it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way” to serve a valid interest.”).
302. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2154.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 2179 (Gorsuch J., dissenting).
305. See id. at 2179-180 (stating that the Court has to avoid standardless
decision making, and that legal tests used by lower courts should be replicable
and predictable and comparing the plurality’s test to a “hunters stew: Throw in
anything that looks interesting, stir, and season to taste”).
306. Id. at 2180.
307. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v. Box, 949 F.3d 997,
999 (CA7 2019) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
308. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
309. Id.
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because they were erroneous in applying the Hellerstedt balancing
standard.
4. Adherence to Stare Decisis in this Case was
Inappropriate Because the Facts Were Not Similar or
Identical to Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt
Justice Thomas claimed that the plurality’s and the
concurrence’s adherence to the legal doctrine of stare decisis did not
comport with the Court’s duty to faithfully interpret the meaning of
the Constitution.310 He believed that because Roe and its
descending cases were premised on the wrong interpretation of the
Constitution, those cases should not have had any control.311 Justice
Thomas disagreed with Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to adhere
to the Hellerstedt decision and instead believed that the continued
adherence to the Court’s abortion precedent was unjustified.312
Further, he argued that because not even five justices in this case
could agree on the right interpretation of the precedent evidenced
that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence could not be trusted or
preserved.313 He emphasized stare decisis’ purpose of maintaining
a “principled and intelligent development of the law” to argue that
the Court’s abortion jurisprudence is incompatible with this
purpose.314 He finally contended that the plurality had recognized
the implied fundamental right of privacy in Griswold and abortion
in Roe based on a tendency to exceed constitutional authority
through the use of erroneous precedent rather than stare decisis. 315
Next, Justice Alito argued that the doctrine of stare decisis was
wrongly used by the plurality and Chief Justice.316 He asserted that
Russo was entirely different from Hellerstedt.317 He argued that just
because the Texas and Louisiana laws were largely the same, it did
not mean that the admitting privileges requirements would have
had the same effects on abortion access in Louisiana.318 He used the
fact that in Hellerstedt the abortion providers brought suit after the
enactment of the statute was already in place and had already
burdened the providers and abortion access to differentiate this

310. Id. at 2151 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
311. Id. (referring to cases such as Casey, Hellerstedt, Gonzales, and
Griswold where implied fundamental rights that cannot be found written in the
Constitution have been found).
312. See id. at 2151-52 (stating that Roe cannot be continuously adhered to
when not even one justice today will defend it).
313. Id. at 2152.
314. Id.
315. Id. (arguing that Roe and its progeny should be overruled).
316. Id. at 2157 (Alito, J., dissenting).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1258.
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case.319 Because the abortion providers brought suit before the
enactment of Act 620 had even taken place, he contended that
Hellerstedt did not control and stare decisis should not have been
adhered to.320
Justice Gorsuch similarly argued that strict adherence to stare
decisis in this case was inappropriate, but only argued so against
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence.321 He relied on two reasons for
why the Chief Justice’s adherence to stare decisis was not proper
for this case.322 First, the facts in this case did not identically match
those of Hellerstedt.323 Second, he argued that the Chief Justice’s
alternative holding was nowhere within the Court’s Hellerstedt
decision.324 Rather, Justice Gorsuch contended that Hellerstedt
“insisted that the substantial obstacle test ‘requires that courts
consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with
the benefits th[e] la[w] confer[s].’”325 Because the Chief Justice’s
ruling did not fit the actual conclusion of Hellerstedt, he did not use
stare decisis to “demand allegiance to a non-existent ruling
inconsistent with the approach actually taken by the Court.”326
Further, Justice Gorsuch argued that litigants start on a clean slate
and while a previous case’s legal rules could create precedent
binding in the current dispute, earlier “fact-bound” decisions
typically “provide only minimal help when other courts consider”
later cases with different factual “circumstances.”327 He asserted
that in this case this rule was ignored and instead the plurality
treated Hellerstedt’s determinations about the Texas law burdening
access to abortion in Texas as if they applied to Louisiana as well.328
He contended that the plurality wrongly treated Hellerstedt’s
conclusions about the Texas law as “universal principles of law,
medicine or economics true in all places and at all times.”329

319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 2180 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
322. Id. 2180-81.
323. Id. at 2181.
324. See id. (“[a]t no point did the Court hold that the burdens imposed by
the Texas law alone—divorced from any consideration of the law's benefits—
could suffice to establish a substantial obstacle”).
325. Id. (quoting Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309) (representing Gorsuch’s
opinion that the Chief Justices proposed undue burden standard for abortion
cases is wrong and that the correct standard considers both the benefits and the
burdens, but there is no balancing test applied to determine whether a law
imposes an undue burden).
326. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2181.
327. Id. at 2178 (citing Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 65-66 (2001)).
328. See Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2178 (suggesting that instead of the litigants
here starting with a clean slate, the plurality instead suggests that if the same
exact effects the Texas statute had on abortion access in 2016 would have the
same effects in Louisiana in 2020 because the statutes are practically identical).
329. Id.
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5. The District Court Findings were Clearly Erroneous
The final issue of debate amongst the dissenting justices was
that the plurality granted too much deference to the district court
whose factual findings were clearly erroneous.330 First, Justice Alito
argued that the plurality and Chief Justice overlooked the “flawed
legal standard on which the district court’s findings depends, and
they ignored the gross deficiencies of the evidence in the record.”331
Act 620 was enjoined from going into effect and the district court
predicted what the effects on abortion access would have been and
concluded that none of the abortion providers in the state would be
replaced if Act 620’s requirements forced them to leave the practice
of abortion.332
Justice Alito stated that the findings of the district court relied
on a flawed test, the good faith test.333 He claimed that the providers
“had everything to lose and nothing to gain by obtaining privileges”
and instead the court should have focused on whether the providers’
efforts to obtain the privileges would have been the same if they
knew their ability to perform abortions was at stake.334 Further, the
justice argues that not only did the district court use the wrong test,
but the evidence failed to show that the doctors made great efforts
to obtain the admitting privileges.335 According to Justice Alito, the
evidence did not show that the doctors attempted with the requisite
effort to obtain admitting privileges and that Act 620 would not
have driven these providers out of practice, finding that the district
court’s findings on the effects of the acts could not stand.336 He
concluded by arguing that the case should be remanded for a new
trial because the Court did not require the doctors to prove the
requisite effort in obtaining hospital admitting privileges.337
Justice Gorsuch also agreed that supplying deference to the
330. Id. at 2158 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2179 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting);
id. at 2152-53 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
331. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2158 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Kliebert, 250 F.
Supp. 3d at 87) (finding the Louisiana law would have a substantial negative
effect on access to abortion).
332. See Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 82 (suggesting Justice Alito’s
disagreement with the district court over this issue; he believes that abortion
providers who would be forced out of business would be replaced by other
providers who could obtain the admitting privileges).
333. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2159 (Alito, J., dissenting); Kliebert, 250 F. Supp.
3d at 82.
334. Id. at 2159-60.
335. Id. at 2160 (relying on evidence such as Doe 2 “half-heartedly” applying
for privileges and declining to apply for privileges at a hospital where he
previously had privileges and where Doe 3 maintained privileges with the
excuse of the hospital being a “catholic hospital”).
336. Id.
337. Id.
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district court’s findings of fact and decision in this case was clearly
erroneous.338 He asserted that the Court should review the case de
novo.339 He disagreed with the plurality’s deference to the district
court’s findings of Act 620’s benefits and the determination that the
benefits were so minimal that the burdens were undue.340 Justice
Gorsuch argued that because the plurality wrongly declined to
apply the Court’s normal standard of de novo review and instead
applied the clear error standard, the decision proceeded on an
erroneous premise and was therefore amiss.341
Further, Justice Thomas argued that Act 620 was
constitutional because the implied fundamental right to an abortion
found in Roe had no basis or support and needed to be overruled.342
Justice Alito asserted that the Court used the abortion right like a
“bulldozer to flatten legal rules that stand in the way.”343 He
reached the conclusion that the plurality and the Chief Justice
brushed aside rules and took short cuts to come to the conclusion
that Act 620 imposed an undue burden on Louisiana women’s access
to abortion.344 The Justice stated that this Court had a duty to resist
straying from the neutral principles governing judicial review, but
the plurality’s opinion proved that the Court was unwilling to do
so.345 Justice Gorsuch believed the decision of this case was a sign
that the Court had lost its way.346 And, finally, Justice Kavanaugh
asserted that there needed to be more factfinding done in order to
declare whether the Act was constitutional or not, indicating his
belief that the plurality’s decision in striking it down was
premature.347 In conclusion, all of the dissenting justices were in
agreement that the plurality’s decision to strike down Act 620 as
unconstitutional was erroneous and misleading.

338. Id. at 2179 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996)) (asserting that it would “be inconsistent with the idea
of a unitary system of law for the Supreme Court to defer to lower court legal
holdings”).
339. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2179 (Gorsuch J., dissenting).
340. See id. (disagreeing with the plurality for reviewing for clear error not
only the district court's findings about how the law will affect abortion access,
but also the lower court's judgment that the law's effects impose a “substantial
obstacle”).
341. Id. (“By declining to apply our normal de novo standard of review to
questions of law like these, today's decision proceeds on the remarkable premise
that, even if the district court was wrong on the law, a duly enacted statute
must fall because the lower court wasn't clearly wrong”).
342. Id. at 2152-53 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 2181-82 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 2182.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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IV. DEPARTING FROM THE STATUS QUO IN THE ABORTION
CONTEXT IS NECESSARY TO PROMOTE THE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS OF WOMEN IN THIS COUNTRY
Russo is regarded as a win for the pro-choice movement and
proponents of abortion in general,348 but was it really a win? This
case essentially informed states that if they were to change the
wording of abortion regulations to make them different from Act
620, the Court will likely uphold them.349 And because the Court did
not address Louisiana’s disfavor and hostility towards abortion, a
state legislature’s ability, and deference to regulate abortion with
the main purpose of restricting it remains unchecked. Additionally,
because this case was practically factually identical to Hellerstedt,
this case should have never been reviewed by the Court in the first
place. This decision was correct in striking down Act 620, but it did
nothing to further the abortion right nor protect it.
This personal analysis will first address how the Court avoided
analyzing specific evidence found by the district court indicating
that Act 620 was created with the purpose of blocking access to
abortion. Second, this section will address Louisiana’s disfavor and
hostility towards abortion rights. Further, this section will explain
how the male dominated legislative branch within the federal and
state governments have a negative impact on abortion rights.
Finally, this section will address the discriminatory effects that
abortion regulations have on women in this country and how the
bipartisan polarization of the issue has completely overshadowed
the fight for women’s rights and equality in the abortion context.

A. Act 620 was Enacted with the Purpose of Blocking
Access to Abortion
The Russo Court reached the right decision in striking down
Louisiana’s Act 620 as unconstitutional.350 But the Court never
analyzed the Louisiana Legislature’s purpose and intent in the
creation of Act 620. The district court found that the Louisiana
Legislature created Act 620 with the partial purpose of restricting

348. Nancy Northup, STATEMENT: Supreme Court Rules in favor of
Abortion Providers in June Medical Services v. Russo, CTR. FOR REPROD.
RIGHTS (June 29, 2020), www.reproductiverights.org/press-room/statementsupreme-court-rules-favor-abortion-providers-june-medical-services-v-russo
[perma.cc/YTB2-9MWN].
349. See Millhiser, supra note 228 (suggesting that the Chief Justice’s
adherence to stare decisis and striking down the abortion regulation did more
to indicate to those in opposition of abortion how to destroy the right in future
litigation).
350. Id. at 2132.
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access to abortion.351 The Court never addressed the facts
evidencing the Louisiana Legislature’s disfavor towards abortion or
the hostile climate against abortion in the state. The Court was
correct in concluding that Act 620 was unconstitutional, but it could
have done more to protect a woman’s right to choose through
analyzing the true purpose of Act 620. Chief Justice Roberts’s
concurrence effectively raises a flag indicating to state legislatures
that if they were to enact abortion regulations different from Act
620, he would find in favor of the states.352 If the Court had done
more to emphasize the evidence indicating Louisiana’s improper
purpose of enacting Act 620, it would have helped prevent future
state regulations made with the purpose of restricting access to
abortion. But instead, the Court’s avoidance in analyzing the true
purpose behind Act 620 undermines and threatens the abortion
right completely. This holding aids in the anti-abortion agenda
rather than protecting a woman’s right to choose.

B. Louisiana’s Hostile Attitude and Climate Towards
Abortion
There should have been more emphasis on the Louisiana
Legislature’s disfavor towards abortion in the Court’s analysis of
this case. A state legislature may not enact a regulation with the
purpose of restricting access to abortion.353 Here, the Court found
that Act 620’s admitting privileges requirement served no valid
medical or safety purpose, but instead, that it was enacted with the
purpose of restricting access to abortions.354 Yet, the Court never
analyzed the district court’s findings of fact regarding the true
purpose of Louisiana’s enactment of Act 620. If the Court was to
include this analysis, it could have effectively helped to protect and
preserve the Roe ruling and the future of the abortion right.
Because the Court did not do so, the future of the abortion right
does not look bright.
The Louisiana Legislature has a codified statement laying out
its legislative intent clearly expressing its disfavor and opposition
351. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 54-56, 87; La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.8; see
also State v. Aguillard, 567 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990), writ denied, 571
So. 2d 631 (La. 1990) (finding that the Louisiana legislature expressed its
disdain and disfavor for abortion with its La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.8 provision).
352. See generally Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2141-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(finding Act 620 unconstitutional only due to its similarity to the Texas statute
in Hellerstedt, suggesting that if a state was to enact a statute different from
Act 620, he would uphold it as constitutional).
353. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (stating that regulation with the purpose of
restricting and burdening access to abortion is improper because “the means
chosen by the state to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to
inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it”).
354. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2131-32.
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towards abortion.355 Louisiana has also enacted a “trigger ban,”
which will completely prohibit abortions if Roe is ever overturned.356
Further, the district court found that Act 620 was modeled after
similar laws which had the effect of closing abortion clinics in other
states.357 The Louisiana Legislature further expressed that Act 620
would build upon the work done “to make Louisiana the most prolife state in the nation.”358 The Court should have examined the
legislature’s purpose behind the creation of Act 620.359
There is evidence to demonstrate how hostile Louisiana is
towards abortion providers, clinics, and abortion in general.360
Additionally, there is also evidence to demonstrate that Louisiana’s
hostility towards abortion will likely lead to the closure of clinics
within the state and forced retirement by providers performing
abortion services all together.361 Additionally, in the 2020 election,
Louisiana voters approved an amendment to the state’s constitution
which added language that offers no protection for a woman’s right
to an abortion and would prevent state courts from finding state
abortion regulations unconstitutional should Roe be overturned.362
355. See La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.8 (showing the legislative history of the
creation of the act that represented the Louisiana legislatures intent to restrict
access to abortion); see also State v. Aguillard, 567 So. 2d 674, 676-77 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1990), writ denied, 571 So. 2d 631 (La. 1990) (finding that the Louisiana
legislature expressed its disdain and disfavor for abortion with its La. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1061.8 provision and indicated that if Roe was to be overturned their
former policy prohibiting abortion in any and all contexts would be enforced).
356. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.
357. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 55-56.
358. LouisianaRightToLife, Governor Jindal Press Conference on 2014 ProLife
Legislation,
YOUTUBE
(Mar.
7,
2014)
www.youtube.com/watch?v=7q7yL4V_DDk&feature=youtu.be
[perma.cc/RH8W-ZHNQ] (recording of Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal
stating that the admitting privileges requirement of Act 620 will further the
state’s intent to be the most pro-life state in the country); see also Memorandum
of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Application for Temporary Restraining Order
and Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19-20, June Med. Serv., L.L.C. v.
Caldwell, 2014 WL 4296679 (2014) (No. 3:14-cv-525), 2014 WL 12923494
(showing testimony and evidence presented to the district court indicating that
Act 620’s true purpose was to impede access to abortion).
359. See generally Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Landscape: From Hostile
to
Supportive,
GUTTMACHER
INST.
(Aug.
29,
2019),
www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/08/state-abortion-policy-landscape-hostilesupportive [perma.cc/9QS3-VG8F] (evidencing that twenty-nine states
demonstrate hostility to abortion and forty-million women of reproductive age
live in these states demonstrating hostility).
360. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 51, 82 (showing that the Louisiana climate
towards abortion is hostile evidenced by harassment and violence towards
abortion providers and interference in providing abortion services by antiabortion activists resulting in fearful providers not being able to continue
providing abortion services and access to Louisiana women).
361. Id.
362. Par Guide to the 2020 Constitutional Amendments, PUB. AFFAIRS RES.
COUNCIL
(Sept.
2020),
www.parlouisiana.org/wp-
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It is also true that Louisiana has enacted eighty-nine abortion
regulations since Roe, more than any other state in the nation.363
This further indicates that the purpose behind Act 620 and other
Louisiana abortion regulations is not about maternal health and
safety, but rather about the state’s opposition to abortion in
general.364 These examples of Louisiana laws, statements, and its
hostile climate towards abortion evidence the disfavor the
Louisiana Legislature has towards abortion. The evidence seems to
imply that Louisiana is more interested in protecting the rights of
the unborn child than it is in protecting the right of women in
choosing to undergo an abortion.365
Through an investigation and analysis of the true purpose
behind the enactment of Act 620, and all abortion regulations, the
Court could help promote the representation of women’s interests
such as abortion, but instead, it avoided and failed to do so. What is
necessary is more transparency. The district court decided that the
evidence described above was enough to suggest that the Louisiana
Legislature’s true intent behind Act 620 was to block abortion
access in the state and, was therefore, unreasonable.366 So why was
this evidence not also reiterated and emphasized by the Court? If
the Court would have emphasized the evidence supporting that Act
620 was unreasonable due to the Louisiana Legislature’s intent to
impede access to abortion rather than protect maternal health,
state legislatures would have been notified that they can no longer
create legislation restricting the abortion right solely due to their
own disfavor towards abortion. Louisiana is not the only state with
a hostile history towards abortion.367 This indicates that if the Court
content/uploads/2020/09/PAR_ConstAmend2020FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/3WQKJ6V9]; see Caroline Kelly, Louisiana voters approve amendment limiting
abortion protections, according to CNN projections, CNN (Nov. 4, 2020),
www.cnn.com/2020/11/04/politics/election-abortion-ballot-measures-louisianacolorado/index.html [perma.cc/J4SC-HQ56] (demonstrating that Louisiana
voters voted in favor of the amendment to add language expressly denying
protection to abortion rights).
363. See Elizabeth Nash, Louisiana Has Passed 89 Abortion Restrictions
Since Roe: It’s About Control, Not Health, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 11, 2020),
www.guttmacher.org/article/2020/02/louisiana-has-passed-89-abortionrestrictions-roe-its-about-control-not-health
[perma.cc/2QRR-NFCG]
(evidencing that Louisiana has attempted to restrict access to abortion through
the implementation of state regulations more than any other state across the
nation and evidencing that their true intention is not to promote patient’s
health but to restrict access to abortion services and stigmatize the procedure
all-together).
364. Id.
365. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 56.
366. Id.
367. See Andrea Michelson, How the states with the best access to abortion
services compare to the worst, INSIDER (Dec. 8, 2020), www.insider.com/usstates-with-best-access-to-abortion-compared-to-worst-2020-12
[perma.cc/3KDW-T8E3] (demonstrating that other states are just as, or even
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would have emphasized the volatile hostility within Louisiana and
its legislature in creating and enacting Act 620, then the abortion
right could have been better insulated from other restrictive
abortion laws created by other conservative states.
Here, the Court avoided examining Louisiana’s true purpose in
enacting Act 620, even though the district court found facts
suggesting it was due to disfavor towards abortion.368 This
avoidance does nothing to provide support and protection to the
woman’s right to choose. The Court should have struck down Act
620 based on the improper purpose behind its enactment. The Court
could have included the district court’s findings that the legislature
enacted Act 620 solely based on its disfavor towards abortion. This
would promote transparency and stop legislatures from restricting
the abortion right merely because they disfavor abortions. More
protection was due to women in this country and the Court here did
not deliver. A woman’s right to choose should be given priority over
a state’s disfavor and hostility towards the practice.

C. Male-Dominated Legislatures: Impeding Women’s
Rights on an Issue Solely Affecting Women
It is no surprise that state legislatures are male dominated.369
This majority gives males more of a say over a woman’s right to an
abortion than women.370 This is a significant problem, and the
Court has added to it by not analyzing the true purpose behind
Louisiana’s enactment of Act 620. If male dominated state
legislatures get to continue to regulate abortions, it does not seem
like too much to ask for there to be a thorough check on these
decisions and regulations. Many argue that abortion is an issue that
should be left to the democratic majority to decide,371 but how
more, hostile towards abortion than Louisiana, such as Alabama, Arkansas, and
Kentucky).
368. See generally LousianaRightToLife, supra note 358 (demonstrating
that Louisiana’s governor held a press conference declaring the creation of Act
620 and the legislature’s purpose in remaining a pro-life state).
369. See Kelly Mena, Study Finds State Legislatures are Dominated by
White Men, CNN (July 8, 2020), www.cnn.com/2020/07/08/politics/statelegislature-diversity-study-2020/index.html
[perma.cc/XT5Z-N8WS]
(evidencing that males make up seventy-one percent of current state
legislatures).
370. See generally Erin Durkin & Max Benwell, These 25 Republicans – All
White Men – just voted to ban abortion in Alabama, GUARDIAN (May 14, 2019),
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/may/14/alabama-abortion-ban-whitemen-republicans [perma.cc/8AQ9-F4FD] (explaining that, in 2019, the maledominated Alabama State Senate passed the most restrictive abortion law in
the United States making abortion a crime at any stage of pregnancy).
371. Marjorie Dannenfelser, Modernize U.S. abortion law - and return
abortion policy to the democratic process, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 29, 2021),
www.scotusblog.com/2021/11/modernize-u-s-abortion-law-and-return-abortion-
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representative is the democratic majority for the female population?
Women make up half the population in the United States, but still,
only make up less than thirty percent of seats in Congress.372 In
2019, women only made up approximately fifteen percent of
Louisiana’s State Legislature, placing them on the bottom of the list
compared to other state legislatures.373 This is proof that democratic
majorities and state legislatures are not fully representative of
women and their interests, including their interest in the right to
abortion.
In states with more significant representation of women in the
state legislature, legislation has been enacted to provide support
and protection for the abortion right.374 This indicates that male
dominated legislatures are not effectively, adequately, or
appropriately representing the views, needs, and rights of female
citizens in many states across the country.
Males cannot get pregnant and, therefore, do not face the
difficult decision of having to choose whether to terminate a
pregnancy. So why are abortion restrictions left in the hands of
legislatures made up of a majority of male members? There is no
way a male dominate state legislature can ever make an
appropriate and representative regulation on abortion because of
their inability to face this issue themselves. The bodily integrity and
autonomy of males are not affected by abortion restrictions, and
therefore, there is no way for male legislators to truly know what
abortion entails.
policy-to-the-democratic-process/ [perma.cc/UR2U-2KCG].
372. See generally Jessica Flores, Women are making gains towards ‘equal
representation’ in Congress: They’ll represent about 25% of all seats in 2021,
USA
TODAY
(Nov.
5,
2020),
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/05/us-congressrecord-number-women-2020-election/6181741002/
[perma.cc/7BCA-L5MW]
(indicating that even though women are increasing their representation within
Congress, they still only represent around 25% of the seats, leaving Congress to
be male dominated).
373. Women in State Legislatures 2019, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POLITICS,
www.cawp.rutgers.edu/facts/levels-office/state-legislature/women-statelegislatures-2019 [perma.cc/7BTL-WDUM] (last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
Louisiana ranked forty-seventh out of all fifty states in representation of women
in their state legislature. Id.
374. See State Legislatures Gender 2015, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS.
(2015),
www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/About_State_Legislatures/Gender.pdf
[perma.cc/3HA8-E6DF] (evidencing that Louisiana had a lower percentage of
women represented in their state legislatures as opposed to states like Illinois,
Maine, and Vermont who have taken steps to protect the abortion right); see
also Kaia Hubbard, A Guide To Abortion Laws by State, U.S. NEWS WORLD REP.
(Sept. 1, 2021), www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/a-guide-to-abortionlaws-by-state (highlighting which states have notoriously tried to block and
impede he abortion right like Louisiana, Alabama, and Missouri, while others
have acted in ways to protect it, like Illinois, Maine, and Vermont).
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In 2018, Maine elected the largest number of women into their
state legislature.375 Due to these newly elected female legislators,
the Maine Legislature eventually passed two new abortion laws
that “ma[de] it easier for women to afford and find abortion care in
the rural state.”376 Comparatively, in 2019, the Alabama State
Legislature passed an abortion ban that only gave three women a
voice on the vote.377 The abortion ban declared that “providing an
abortion to a 12-year-old girl who was raped by her father is a more
serious crime [than] raping a 12-year-old girl.”378 This comparison
shows how the presence of women on state legislators can
significantly affect how abortion is perceived and how a legislative
body will address abortion issues. If more women were given a voice
on the Alabama abortion ban, it may have never been passed or at
least more compassion and empathy would have been shown in the
creation of the regulation. With more compassion and empathy, a
woman’s bodily integrity and autonomy will be better insulated,
respected, and recognized through abortion legislation and will
better serve the interests in preserving and promoting women’s
health and safety.
In 2019, the United States also saw a wide array of protests
against tough state abortion bans.379 These large protests both in
Poland and the United States, including in Louisiana,380 indicate
that regulations on abortion need to be changed and women’s basic
human rights can no longer be taken away due to stigmatization,
disfavor, and the unwarranted intrusion by male-dominated
375. Patty Wight, Newly Blue, Maine Expands Access to Abortion, NPR (July
2, 2019), www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/07/02/737046658/newly-bluemaine-expands-access-to-abortion [perma.cc/4G8B-5PLF].
376. See id. (expressing that the two new Maine abortion laws “will be the
single most important event since Roe v. Wade in the [S]tate of Maine”).
377. Meagan Flynn, ‘A typical male answer’: Only 3 women had a voice in
Alabama Senate as 25 men passed abortion ban, WASH. POST (May 15, 2019),
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/05/15/typical-male-answer-onlywomen-had-voice-alabama-senate-men-passed-abortion-ban/ [perma.cc/L4HS62UM].
378. Eric Levitz, The GOP’s Assault on Abortion Rights is Tyranny of the
Minority,
INTELLIGENCER
(May
16,
2019),
nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/05/alabama-abortion-ban-heartbeat-law-rapeincest-polls-republicans.html [perma.cc/52MA-BTDF].
379. In pictures: Protests across US against abortion bans, BBC NEWS (May
22, 2019), www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48361312 [perma.cc/3YF9ZMSQ].
380. See Maria Clark, Abortion rights supporters protest Louisiana’s push to
further
restrict
abortion
access,
NOLA.COM
(May
22,
2019),
www.nola.com/news/article_87cdd6a2-4d41-5141-a8a0-25c35523a5cc.html
[perma.cc/A6GT-QWQR] (demonstrating that there were even large protests of
hundreds of people within Louisiana who were protesting Louisiana’s actions
towards restricting abortion access, further indicating that the Louisiana maledominated legislature did not represent all Louisianan citizens views on the
abortion right).
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legislatures. It is time women’s rights are taken into consideration
and given a sense of significance and priority, and for their voices,
needs, and views to be adequately represented in state and federal
legislatures.
Throughout history, the criminalization and abolition of
abortion have been used as a tool of control over female citizens’
bodies.381 But a woman is not an object. One’s choice to exercise her
right to an abortion should not be something that can be
manipulated, controlled, or dominated by others who have no idea
what it’s like to be in her situation. A woman’s fundamental right
to choose deserves the Court’s utmost prioritization, analysis, and
protection. And the Court should be scrutinizing the actions of state
legislatures to emphasize that women and their bodies are not
things that can or should be under the control of governmental
bodies. There needs to be an increase of female voices within state
legislatures in the abortion context so that a woman’s bodily
integrity and autonomy will no longer be denied. The judicial
branch also needs to have a larger presence in the making of
abortion regulations to ensure that women are treated equally and
fairly.

D. Politicization of the Abortion Right has Created a
Constructed Controversy that has Effectively Led to
the Discrimination of Women and the Denial of
Their Bodily Integrity and Autonomy
Abortion has become a highly controversial issue in this
country, but it is also an implied fundamental right that should be
preserved and protected.382 Each year many women will decide
whether to exercise this right.383 By analyzing the true purpose
state legislatures have in enacting abortion regulations, the Court
will be making sure maternal health and patient safety are the only
state interests involved. A Woman’s reasons for choosing to undergo
an abortion cannot be looked at as second best or as an afterthought.
It is time that the Court steps in and chooses women’s rights first
when they are being burdened based on state legislatures’ disfavor
381. Laurie Penny, The Criminalization of Women’s Bodies Is All About
Conservative
Male
Power,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(May
17,
2019),
www.newrepublic.com/article/153942/criminalization-womens-bodiesconservative-male-power [perma.cc/SGJ9-DT6L].
382. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (stating that the implied fundamental right of
privacy is “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy”).
383. See Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept.
2019),
www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-united-states
[perma.cc/K22W-Y4PZ] (demonstrating that approximately 862,320 abortions
were performed in the United States in 2017).
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towards the abortion right. It is not necessary for the abortion right
to be absolute, but women deserve to be treated as if their rights,
interests, and concerns matter.
The late Ruth Bader Ginsburg was correct in her proposal that
Roe would have done more to promote the abortion right and
women’s rights if the Court adverted to equal protection
considerations rather than due process considerations.384 By
creating a right to privacy in the abortion context, the Court granted
women “expensive, limited, and easily revocable guest privileges at
the exclusive men’s club called the Constitution.”385 And through
the granting of this abortion right in Roe,386 it seems nothing more
than additional controversy, divided lines, and the continued
governance and coercion over women’s rights and bodily integrity
has ensued.387 As long as the issue over whether abortion should be
legally accessible to women in this country remains a heavily
divided debate, women will continue to be discriminated against.388
The divided abortion debate has wrongly become a battle of the
left vs. the right that has overshadowed women’s rights
altogether.389 This highly polarized political debate has turned
abortion rights into political theatre.390 The abortion issue is no
384. Ruth B. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 383 (1985).
385. Twiss Butler, Abortion Law: “Unique Problem for Women” or Sex
Discrimination?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 139 (1991).
386. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
387. See Chloe Atkins, ‘A crisis moment:’ States, advocates brace for new
fight
over
abortion
rights,
NBC
(Jan.
11,
2021),
www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/crisis-moment-states-advocatesbrace-new-fight-over-abortion-rights-n1253665
[perma.cc/36KF-XDRV]
(portraying that the states and the Supreme Court are both divided on the
abortion issue in this country); see Ellman, supra note 17 (indicating that a
woman’s right to an abortion has been under attack in recent times by state
legislatures looking to put an end to abortion access, therefore continuing state
governance over woman’s bodily integrity).
388. See Butler, supra note 385 (expressing her view that “[t]o participate
on either side of the debate on the present terms is to be a party to sexual
harassment of women and denial of their right to bodily integrity”).
389. See Anna North, How abortion became a partisan issue in America, VOX
(Apr. 10, 2019), www.vox.com/2019/4/10/18295513/abortion-2020-roe-joe-bidendemocrats-republicans [perma.cc/45WK-AC5F] (evincing the history and
background of how the abortion issue has become a debate of the liberal left vs.
the conservative right); See generally Jessica Mendoza, Is our political divide,
at heart, really all about abortion?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 9, 2019),
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2019/0409/Is-our-political-divide-at-heartreally-all-about-abortion [perma.cc/QS8T-XNMB] (signifying that abortion has
such high political impact which has turned the focus over its legality into a tool
used by political parties to gain votes and support for governmental control and
political office).
390. See Mendoza, supra note 389 (suggesting that the real purpose and
reasons behind the polarized debate over the legality and accessibility of
abortion in this country is for politicians to gain votes and support for their
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longer considered a medical issue that should be analyzed to protect
a woman’s safety and health.391 Rather, it has become part of a
political agenda. This political agenda has even made its way into
the judiciary where abortion is used as a litmus test for the
appointments of Supreme Court justices and lower court judges.392
With the issue of abortion becoming a political tool, it is evident that
women’s rights, well-being, and equality have been put on the
backburner once again.393 Globally, people have differing opinions
surrounding the issue of abortion,394 but only in the United States
do these differing opinions on abortion play a central role in
politics.395 While American women patiently wait for the
government and the courts to decide if abortion can be legal and
accessible, politicians and legislators are busy burdening,
overshadowing, and denominating the issue to one of political fervor
that has nothing to do with women, or their rights, at all.
Because abortion has been heavily regulated and governed by
state legislatures, the government may be viewed as denying
women their bodily integrity and autonomy, without any concerns
for women’s health.396 Because of this bipartisan debate, abortion
in this country is not a medical or bodily autonomy issue, but rather
a moral, religious, and political one.397 This cannot stand. Courts
have consistently recognized and respected the concept of bodily
integrity398 and, therefore, an American woman’s bodily integrity in
political careers and elections).
391. Id.
392. See Albert Hunt, Both parties irrationally make abortion a litmus test,
HILL (June 12, 2019), www.thehill.com/opinion/campaign/448114-both-partiesirrationally-make-abortion-a-litmus-test [perma.cc/3UGW-GFZJ] (evidencing
that both the liberal left and the conservative right have made the abortion
issue a political litmus test: “You must be pro-choice to advance as a Democrat,
pro-life to be a top Republican”); see also Mangan, supra note 3 (illustrating how
Donald Trump was using abortion as a litmus test to appoint Supreme Court
justices who would work to overturn Roe).
393. Julia Gillard, A Global Story: Women’s suffrage, forgotten history, and
a way forward, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 2020), www.brookings.edu/essay/aglobal-story/ [perma.cc/VB23-5JQS].
394. Marge Berer, Abortion Law and Policy Around the World: In Search of
Decriminalization, HEALTH & HUMAN RIGHTS 13-27 (2017).
395. See Ziad Munson, Abortion Politics, POLITY PRESS 5 (2018) (evincing
how America has treated the issue of abortion differently than other countries
around the world and have actually made it a central issue within their political
system).
396. See generally Ellman, supra note 17 (suggesting that because abortion
has become the increased target of heavy regulation by many state legislatures,
individuals may believe that the government is impeding on a woman’s
fundamental right to privacy rather than working to protect it).
397. Lori Friedman, US Abortion Politics: How Did We Get Here and Where
Are We Headed?, LEHIGH NEWS (June 3, 2019), www.lehigh.edu/news/usabortion-politics-how-did-we-get-here-and-where-are-we-headed
[perma.cc/K5R6-5KMP].
398. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (finding that
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the abortion context deserves respect and recognition.
There is no question that pregnancy causes a “deep intrusion
into a woman’s body,” and when a state restricts access to abortion,
the state is effectively forcing a woman to endure pregnancy against
her own will.399 By enforcing regulations that govern how and when
women are supposed to make decisions regarding their own bodies,
women are being labeled as second-class citizens and being
discriminated against. It’s interesting that a woman can decide
independently when she should engage in sexual relations or when
to ultimately get pregnant but cannot independently decide when
an abortion is in her own best interest. In order to promote the
interests, health, and rights of women in this country, the Court
needs to recognize abortion as being a sex-discrimination issue that
is owed protection under the Equal Protection clause of the
Constitution.400 The Court must confront the question of “how the
United States Constitution must respond when women are
discriminated against as women.”401 It is safe to say that laws
protecting an individual’s bodily integrity have not been created or
applied equally to women and men.402 Because the Court is
continuously maintaining the status quo by not recognizing
abortion as a bodily integrity and autonomy issue, abortion will
remain a polarizing political tool used to gain voters and supporters
rather than a tool to protect the rights of women. Using the equal
protection clause to analyze abortion restrictions would better
protect the health, safety, and bodily integrity and autonomy of
women in this country. The Court needs to do more but,
unfortunately, the Court did the opposite in Russo.

bodily integrity is of the utmost importance and was deserving of protection and
that women should be protected from bodily intrusions); see also Pratt v. Davis,
118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1906) (“[T]he free citizen’s first and greatest right, which
underlies all others–the right to the inviolability of his [sic] person, in other
words, his right to himself–is the subject of universal acquiescence”).
399. See Christyne L. Neff, Woman, Womb and Bodily Integrity, 3 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 327, 350 (1991) (emphasizing the effects of state regulations on
abortion and how they effectively require a woman to endure pregnancy and all
the “pain, illness, and risk of injury which pregnancy involves–against her
will”).
400. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1; see Ginsburg, supra note 384 (indicating
that if the Roe Court considered the issue of abortion within sex discrimination
and equal protection matters, a woman’s right to abortion access would be
better protected).
401. See Butler, supra note 385 (suggesting that approaching the abortion
issue from the Equal Protection clause would do more to help protect the
abortion right and women’s rights in general).
402. See Neff, supra note 399 (illustrating how state regulations effectively
deny pregnant women of their own bodily integrity and autonomy, therefore
indicating that state laws over bodily integrity are not equal amongst men and
women in this country).
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V. CONCLUSION: THE ABORTION RIGHT IS SAFE… FOR
NOW
In 1964, a young woman named Gerri Santoro died while
receiving an illegal “back-alley” abortion in Connecticut.403 Before
Roe v. Wade, approximately one million women per year in the
United States resorted to illegal abortions, and out of those one
million, five thousand died annually.404 Just because abortion is
banned does not mean women are going to stop seeking it.
Therefore, abortion regulations need to stop being highly
restrictive, and instead need to promote access to abortion that is
safe, healthy, and effective. There is no reason more lives need to be
lost to the performance of illegal abortions by untrained individuals.
There was a lot to be learned from the death of Gerri Santoro, and
evidentially, there still is.
The increase in highly restrictive abortion regulations in
recent years seems to signify a change in the intent behind abortion
regulations from pro-life to pro-birth.405 If women’s rights are not
recognized and their bodily integrity and autonomy are not
respected, there is no way women can be considered equal. There is
no question that abortion is a practice that has been stigmatized for
centuries in this country. But this stigmatization must come to an
end. Women can no longer be viewed as second-class citizens, giving
others a say and control over their bodies. State legislatures need
to change the approach to abortion issues by including more women
in their decisions and a level of compassion, empathy, and respect
towards pregnant women. But with the continuing enactment of
regulations that block abortion access and the continuing usage of
abortion for political gain, it does not seem like this change will ever
be a reality.406 It is true that some states in recent years have taken
steps to protect the abortion right, but there are still too many
403. Amanda Arnold, How a Harrowing Photo of One Woman’s Death
Became an Iconic Pro-Choice Symbol, VICE (Oct. 26, 2016),
www.vice.com/en/article/evgdpw/how-a-harrowing-photo-of-one-womansdeath-became-an-iconic-pro-choice-symbol [perma.cc/SYV7-VRCE].
404. Id.
405. See generally Peter W. Marty, Anti-abortion legislators need a dose of
compassion,
CHRISTIAN
CENTURY
(June
3,
2019),
www.christiancentury.org/article/publisher/anti-abortion-legislators-needdose-compassion [perma.cc/NU6Y-Z9Y2] (examining the recent trend of
increasing “draconian” style abortion laws that seem to protect the birth of a
fetus over the protection of the life of a pregnant woman).
406. See generally Elizabeth Nash et. al., State Policy Trends 2019: A Wave
of Abortion Bans, But Some States Are Fighting Back, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec.
2019),
www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/12/state-policy-trends-2019-waveabortion-bans-some-states-are-fighting-back
[perma.cc/82AG-LZ85]
(demonstrating that many states in the United States in 2019 implemented a
wave of twenty-five new abortion regulations that had the effect of blocking
access to abortion).
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states who are looking to impede access to abortion.407 The world
and times are changing, and so needs the perception and stigma
against abortion.
It is time women have full basic human rights that cannot be
changed, controlled, or taken away by the government. The Court
needs to take a stand and protect these basic human rights,
including the right to an abortion, through a strict analysis of state
regulations that impede on abortion rights. Russo did not expand
abortion rights. It merely stuck with the status quo and delayed the
seemingly inevitable overturning of Roe. With the creation of a
conservative majority on the Court, the overturning of Roe is no
longer a fantasy. It is real. Women are close to losing their implied
fundamental right to an abortion, and with it their autonomy and
control over their own bodies. The Court now has the potential to
substantially undermine, and possibly overturn, Roe and a woman’s
fundamental right to choose.408 If this isn’t unsettling, then I don’t
know what is. The Russo Court may have upheld the abortion right,
but it in no way increased its protection. Rather, the Court stuck
with the status quo instead of going the extra mile to cushion a
woman’s right to choose.

407. Id. (evidencing that in 2019, U.S. state policies blocking abortion access
outweighed policies to protect the right, but the gap is closing with thirty-six
regulations that protect abortion being enacted).
408. David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Abortion at the Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2021), www.nytimes.com/2021/12/02/briefing/supreme-courtabortion-case-mississippi.html [perma.cc/A4BY-SCAU] (suggesting that the
Court is leaning towards undermining the right to choose set in Roe in the
most recent abortion case of Jackson).

